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ABSTRACT: Despite its potential to diminish the culpability of battered
women accused of crimes, neurobiological evidence has yet to be meaningfully
deployed in the interest of these defendants. This Article describes how
neurobiological evidence can provide insights into the effects of battering, at
both an individual and ecological level. Domestic violence prevention
advocates and medical professionals are becoming increasingly conscious of
the neurobiological consequences of battering, producing a wellspring of
evidence with potential relevance to the battered woman's case. By distilling
this evidence into tangible assertions admissible in myriad legal settings, this
Article lays a foundation for the integration of neurobiological evidence into
the defense of battered women.
Breaking rank with contemporary literature on the subject, this Article
adopts a position of pragmatic acquiescence to the continued use of the
embattled battered woman syndrome. Unlike previous reforms advanced,
neurobiological evidence does not necessitate the creation of new law nor does
it entail the recognition of an archetypal battered woman. The evidence works
cooperatively with existing defense strategies to provide a holistic account of
battering for the purposes of reducing the battered woman defendant's
culpability.
Scholarship is sharply divided about the role of neurobiology in the
criminal law. Skepticism abounds about the philosophical relevance of
neurobiological evidence to the law. The delicate balancing of legal norms
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reflected in criminal law's current use of neurobiology is placed in a distinctly
new light when viewed from the perspective of a battered woman's legal
defense.
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INTRODUCTION
Frequently, when a battered woman2 is convicted of a crime connected to
her history of abuse, she becomes a double victim. 3 She is first a victim in the
2. Judith Butler describes the labels that confine and define us as constantly being negotiated above
our heads. Audio Recording: Giving Account of Oneself, Reading Group Discussion at Becomings,
Misplacements, Departures: Butler and Whitehead as Catalysts for Contemporary Thought (Dec. 4,
2009), http://deimos3.apple.com/WebObjects/Core.woa/Browse/cgu.edu.33754425 10?i=1 936454726.
These negotiations, which she aptly refers to as noise, are ongoing and beyond the control of those to
whom the labels apply. Id. As a potential contributor to the noise negotiating a label for the group of
people affected by domestic violence, I believe it is necessary to speak as clearly as I can to the potential
costs and benefits of utilizing the term "battered woman" throughout this Article. Feminists were early
adopters of postmodern discourse. See Lori G. Beaman, Women's Defences: Contextualizing Dilemmas
of Difference and Power, 9 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 87 (1998). Language, which feminists recognized as
the mechanism for creating social realities, played an especially prominent role in law and policy
addressing domestic violence. Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Words Change, but the Melody Lingers: The
Persistence of the Battered Woman Syndrome in Criminal Cases Involving Battered Women, 9
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 110, 125 (2003). Arguably, the term "battered woman" is problematic
because it suggests that the woman is an object being acted upon, rather than an agent capable of
performing an action. The label "survivor of domestic violence" is worth considering, as it is more
indicative of the woman's capability to persevere in spite of the battering. Even more appropriately,
"survivor of intimate partner violence" goes further by eviscerating any relationship between intimacy
and domesticity. Undoubtedly, such reformed language shifts the woman from being a passive victim to
becoming an active agent. In the context of an abuse victim turned defendant, such a "survivor" could be
facing prison time or in some cases, the death penalty. In such a situation, it would be oddly ironic to
appropriate a term traditionally reserved for those who are free to begin the healing process without fear
of punitive legal action. Moreover, the phrase "battered woman" suggests an implicit directionality,
which I take up in note 3, infra, about who is committing the battering and who is battered. The
ambiguity of the phrase "domestic violence" obscures much of the degree and kind of abuse taking
place. Hence, I will employ the term "battered woman" or "battered women" for these reasons and for
the reasons I outline in note 3, infra.
3. It is important, at the outset, to explain why this work focuses on women and not battered people
more generally. The specificity of the term has both practical and philosophical dimensions. Not every
man or woman who uses violence against a partner is a batterer. Battering is revealed by a course of
conduct that, generally speaking, is intended to coerce and induce fear. See, e.g., Sue Osthoff, But,
Gertrude, I Beg To Differ, a Hit Is Not a Hit Is Not a Hit: When Battered Women Are Arrested for
Assaulting Their Partners, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1521, 1523-24 (2002). Interestingly, the
debate over what constitutes battering as opposed to violence can be understood in terms of
"aggression" and "violence" as elucidated by behavioral scientist Johan van der Dennen. See, e.g., Johan
M.G. van der Dennen, Clinical Aggressology: Neuropathology and (Violent) Aggression, 10
AGGRESSIvE BEHAV. 175 (1984) (proposing that "violence" is purposely motivated, the consequence of
some rational decision-making process, whereas "aggression" is an act of affective, emotional, or
aroused reactivity to a perceived threat). Osthoff argues poignantly that "domestic violence" can exist
without battering. According to van der Dennen's framework, "domestic violence" would be either
violence or aggression, but it is violence and not aggression alone that typifies battering. The resolution
of this issue is important for women who are lumped together with men under the category of batterers.
While research shows that women do exhibit aggression toward their partners, this work does not refute
the conventional thinking that battering, as violence and not merely aggression, is predominantly carried
out by men. See Osthoff, supra, at 1531-34. Regardless of who batters more frequently, the practical
reality reflected in numerous medical accounts is that men and women have differing physiological
responses to stress and that women, not men, account for nearly all of the head injuries sustained during
domestic violence incidents. Id
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obvious sense of having been battered by her partner. Less obviously, she is a
victim of a legal system that struggles to clarify how her abuse history is
relevant to her legal defense-thus, the consequences of the battering fail to
inform the jury's consideration of her culpability, and she is convicted. As a
hypothetical example, suppose Kelly had experienced childhood molestation by
her uncle Arthur. As an adult, Kelly continues to experience abuse by Arthur.
One day, Kelly forces another woman to have sex with Arthur and then
viciously attacks them both-killing Arthur in the process. If not for the
childhood abuse, it is almost impossible to imagine anyone but the most
sadistic individuals committing this crime. To repudiate the prosecution's claim
that she is unusually sadistic, Kelly will offer expert psychological testimony
about the consequences of her childhood abuse: her post-traumatic stress
disorder, her feeling that she was "out of control" at the time of the alleged
crime, and other claims that in front of different audiences may suggest varying
levels of sanity. This is a fine approach, and it is one encountered commonly
among defendants like Kelly. But the cost of premising a defense upon
psychological diagnoses is a risky one given a legal culture that demands clear
delineations of who should and should not be responsible and further requires
that these delineations be quantifiable and not easily feigned.
In this Article I take the position that Kelly, and any other battered woman
defendant charged with a crime that society might interpret as reflecting malice
or criminal motive, would benefit from a greater examination of the
neurobiological effects of battering on behavior and cognition. If Kelly can
demonstrate that at certain times surrounding the commission of the crime, she
experienced dysregulated levels of stress hormones such as DHEA and cortisol
that led to her dissociation, then her defense becomes immediately more
particular and persuasive. Alternately, a defendant like Kelly could assert that
concussions inflicted upon her by her batterer left her with fewer choices and a
violent antagonistic mood within her-claims made viable by an established
and growing body of neurobiological evidence.
Ever since the Victorian-era criminologist Cesare Lambrosio first proposed
that neurobiology be used to explain criminal behavior, much ink has been
spilled over locating the biological basis for, among other crimes, terrorism,4
pedophilia,5 and domestic violence.6 More recently, scholars have considered
4. See, e.g., Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PUB. LIBR. Sci. BIOLOGY 693,
695 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Bums & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia
Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 437 (2003); Martin Walter et al.,
Pedophilia Is Linked to Reduced Activation in Hypothalamus and Lateral Prefrontal Cortex During
Visual Erotic Stimulation, 62 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 698 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Gordon Teichner et al., Assessment of Cognitive Functioning in Men Who Batter, Ill
INT'L J. NEUROSCI. 241 (2001).
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the possibility of using brain scanning technology for lie detection.' In
response, a formidable body of scholarship has emerged that focuses on the
uses to which neurobiological evidence will never be put.8  Amidst the
controversy about neurobiology's general challenges to culpability and
individual responsibility, scholars have overlooked less drastic opportunities
for the relevance of neurobiology in legal contexts. In particular, no work has
yet addressed the potential for brain injuries, caused by abuse, to buttress the
legal defenses of battered women accused of crimes related to that abuse.9 This
Article approaches the issue with guarded optimism, recognizing both that
neurobiological explanations for criminality must be developed
incrementally,10 and that these explanations may not be without unintended
consequences. The lack of inquiry into the neurobiology of battering victims
has allowed untested scientific hypotheses to become consecrated through
repeated application in criminal cases. I argue that using science in these cases
is not inherently problematic, provided the science advanced is reliable,
convincing to laypersons, and mindful of the battered woman's rationality and
own moral agency. Thus, any neurobiological account of the battered woman
defendant must heed the larger crosscurrents of both feminism and the law.
Although the neurobiology of battering's effects is arguably still in its
infancy, a confluence of scientific and legal developments makes this
interdisciplinary question ripe for discussion. Domestic violence advocates are
becoming increasingly concerned about screening for brain injuries, including
concussion." Medical professionals and neuroscientists, too, recognize their
important role in assessing the consequences of battering for the brain.12 When
7. Henry T. Greeley & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 390-94 (describing the business of No Lie MRI, a company that
provides fMRI for lie detection).
8. Stephen Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 CAROOz L. REV.
2545, 2546 (2007) ("[T]he basic sciences are unlikely soon to displace our view of ourselves as
conscious, intentional and potentially rational agents whose behavior can be explained best by our
reasons for action."); Stephen Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges
to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2008) (claiming that neuroscience's
challenges to responsibility cannot succeed); accord Selim Berker, The Normative Insignificance of
Neuroscience, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293, 305-13 (2009) (describing several empirical shortcomings of
neuroscience evidence).
9. These battered women commit crimes at the behest of their abusers or in retaliation against them.
Because this Article is almost entirely informed by scientific and legal research regarding battered
women or female subjects, the term "battered woman" is employed over the more encompassing label of
"intimate partner violence" (IPV). While battering may exist in any relationship, battered women are a
subset of IPV victims, who face and experience particular consequences as a result of their battering.
These particular consequences are what this Article seeks to assess.
10. See, e.g., Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique ofNeurobiology in Criminal
Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183, 229 (2009) (proposing a less ambitious but more granular
integration of neurobiology and criminal law).
11. Special Collection: Traumatic Brain Injury and Domestic Violence: Understanding the
Intersections, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN NETWORK, http://snow.vawnet.org/special-
collections/DVBrainInjury.php (last visited July 25, 2010).
12. See generally infra Part III.
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these victims enter the criminal justice system, however, neurobiological
evidence is rarely invoked in service of their defense. Legal actors, both courts
and defense attorneys, have relied extensively on a narrow, albeit convenient,
conception of battered women that frequently conjures up images of mental
illness or psychological disorder. Scholars, sensitive to the consequences of
aligning responses to abuse with irrational behavior, have suggested
abandoning this approach for a more comprehensive and less stigmatizing
accounting of the various economic, social, and legal circumstances of
battering. While these alternatives avoid the stigmatization of earlier
approaches, their limited traction in altering outcomes in criminal cases
suggests the strength of a partly medical model of the battered woman.
Neurobiological evidence fulfills this function, but offers distinct advantages
over many other types of evidence, such as psychological- or social history
evidence. Current defenses rely heavily on comparisons between classes of
battered women or alternately, attempt to hint at causality through a litany of
intractable environmental influences-conclusions that are nearly impossible to
prove empirically. Recent studies of battered women reveal this population's
exposure to repeated physical forces to the skull and high levels of stress.
Neurobiology has the capacity to delineate the effects of such abuse on both
cognitions and behavior. Altered cognition and behavior are likely to be
significant contributory factors in any criminal act that the battered woman
commits. This evidence can offer particular and concrete connections between
the battering, as cause, and the crime, as effect.' 3
Readers familiar with the history of battered women's cases may
understandably register skepticism about the injection of mental health issues
into such cases. While remaining sensitive to these concerns, I argue that
neurobiological evidence, offered with sufficient circumspection, can be
consistent with upholding the agency of the battered woman. In the past, mental
health evidence was used largely to bolster claims of insanity or diminished
mental capacity.14 Concerns about stigmatizing and diminishing the moral
agency of battered women led feminists to argue for dispensing with such
defenses.15 In cases where the insanity defense is advanced, the court
effectively condemns the battered woman's actions, but regards them as
13. This is not to say that neurobiological evidence offers the only reflection of such abuse. Rather,
the evidence is intended to act in concert with other evidence. Given the tremendous complexity of the
brain, the absence of neurobiological evidence should never be taken to imply the absence of battering.
Rather, the evidence either suggests or confirms abuse.
14. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623, 638 (1980); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan,
Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149, 159-60 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Rebecca D. Cornia, Current Use of Battered Woman Syndrome: Institutionalization of
Negative Stereotypes About Women, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 99, 102 (1997); Anne M. Coughlin,
Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1, 52 (1994).
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excusable because of her putative claim of insanity.' 6 Some feminists have
argued that the injection of mental health evidence vitiates the legitimacy of the
battered woman's actions.1 7 Moreover, the interposition of a host of mental
health stereotypes threatens to scuttle any reliable retelling of the battered
woman's story. An enlightened defense based on objective neurobiological
evidence is far more granular and respectful of the battered woman's agency
than these previous defenses that often led jurors to infer the battered woman's
insanity. In many cases, neurobiological evidence may be extraneous or even
unhelpful. However, defendants charged with crimes for which excuse forms
the only viable defense theory stand to benefit tremendously from building in
more robust excuses that tie the neurobiological effects of abuse closer to the
criminal act, both in time and in cause. For example, avoiding mental health
issues and attempting to frame the battered woman's actions as reasonable may
be desirable if we wish to legitimize the defendant's decision to unlawfully take
her children to another state, but what is the battered woman to do if she is
accused of less understandable actions? Indeed, even feminists antagonistic
toward excuse-based defenses have reversed course in cases where duress was
at issue. It is in these cases that neurobiological evidence may be most
salient. 19
Unlike some of the previous work, I do not argue for the obsolescence of
guilt or the abolition of penological philosophies regarding free will and moral
agency. Rather, as I describe in Part I, my argument requires merely acceptance
of a weak biological determinism that is already compatible with much of
positive law regarding criminality. Instead of forcing the law to relinquish its
utilitarian objectives for purely rehabilitative ones, I merely present
neurobiological evidence that may have implications for measuring the battered
woman's culpability. This assessment is also done within a distinctly different
context than in most cases where neurobiological abnormality is alleged. The
cause of the abnormality is a culpable moral agent who is likely either a victim
or beneficiary of the battered woman's crime. In this sense, neurobiological
evidence functions within a unique factual universe that reconfigures its uses.
16. Francisco Muiioz Conde, Putative Self-Defense: A Borderline Case Between Justification and
Excuse, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 590, 612 (2008) ("Of course, if the mental state of the woman at the
moment she kills her partner is abnormal, because of, for instance, the so called 'battered woman
syndrome,' it is possible to provide her with a full or partial excuse on the grounds of insanity, duress, or
diminished capacity.").
17. Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women's
Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIs U. PUB. L. REv. 155, 169 (2004) (describing the criticism that defenses based
on mental disorders detract from the perception of the battered woman defendant's reasonableness).
18. Id. at 186 (summarizing an apparent contradiction in Anne Coughlin's attitude toward the
"dubious moral position" of battered women who proceed under an excuse, rather than a justification
theory of defense).
19. This can be compared with the forty percent success rate of appeals from homicide charges. See
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 432 (1991).
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In Part II, I will recount the history of legal defenses in battered women's
cases, focusing specifically on areas where science has either helped or
hindered battered women's claims of innocence. The battered woman
syndrome (BWS) is described and its claims to scientific validity examined. I
argue that neurobiological evidence does not supplant BWS, but instead could
update it, consistent with the syndrome's focus on empiricism. Although the
syndrome makes scientific claims that may have catalyzed a broader cultural
readjustment in the understanding of battered women, that same body of
science has little persuasive force today. Although such scientific evidence, in
the form of psychological theories, has figured prominently into the legal
defenses of battered women, many of its conclusions about battering are highly
contested or only true for a narrow class of victims. Throughout Part II, I
discuss the scientific inaccuracy of theories relying on this evidence and
conclude by highlighting how this inadequacy has prompted confusion within
the courts, skepticism by jurors, and a general distrust that taints the credibility
of the battered woman.
In Part III, I distill neurobiological evidence relevant to battered women
into its physical and physiological components. As a guiding principle, the
Article accepts a weak form of determinism inherent in human agency: that is,
there are some instances in which structural or physiological alterations in the
brain will have repercussions that cannot be decided against, overcome, or
willed away. The physical effects are changes to the structural integrity of the
battered woman's brain while the physiological effects are changes to her
internal chemical milieu. Both the physical and physiological effects of
battering have implications for a variety of mental operations. In describing the
physiological effects, I summarize the literature addressing stress responses
driven to their limit. Where such alterations persist, they could lead to legally
cognizable claims of unconsciousness or involuntariness. I conclude by
discussing the process by which these types of evidence could be obtained from
battered women.
In Part IV, I outline several applications for neurobiological evidence in
defense of battered women charged with crimes related to their abuse. I first
show that precedent exists for proffering neurobiological evidence in both trials
and sentencing. In the remainder of Part IV, I offer general strategies for
integrating neurobiological evidence into diverse legal contexts to reduce
culpability or punishment for battered women. In acknowledgement of the
widespread use of plea bargaining in criminal cases, I provide several examples
of neurobiological evidence and its potential to mitigate sentences of convicted
battered women.
Finally, in Part V, I anticipate several criticisms to the integration of
neurobiological evidence into a robust defense for the battered woman.
Although no commentator has directly addressed this precise issue, I predict
124 [Vol. 23:117
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that the proposal will inevitably generate friction with penological and feminist
ideologies.
PART I. BATTERED WOMEN AT THE CROSSROADS OF LAW AND NEUROBIOLOGY
It was only in the 1970s that battered women began introducing a history
of battering for exculpatory purposes.20 Advancements in the criminal law for
battered women's cases have been made through specific defenses rather than a
holistic understanding of battering and its effects. Self-defense, perhaps the
most indefatigable defense in American jurisprudence, resonated earliest with
courts and legal scholars. 21 As a result, courts selectively reduced the battered
woman's culpability in the only context that was believed to merit a claim of
self-defense: retaliation against a batterer. There was little recourse for women
22
accused of crimes not of a retaliatory nature. Grossly oversimplifying,
battering evidence was permitted to support a battered woman's claim to self-
defense when the battered woman killed her batterer during an abusive incident
but less frequently in non-confrontational settings-for instance, where the
batterer was asleep. 23
To account for situations where battered women were barred from claiming
self-defense, scholars advanced arguments for various reforms including
broadening defense elements to better accommodate battered women's
experiences,24 rewriting evidence rules to permit more battering evidence,25
20. Myra MacPherson, Battered Wives and Self-Defense Pleas, WASH. PosT, Dec. 4, 1977, at Al
(regarding the emerging use of self-defense in battered women's cases as "a controversial new trend in
legal attitudes regarding the age-old doctrine of self-defense").
21. Self-defense is a keystone legal defense. See, e.g., Note, A Trespasser's Right of Self-Defense
When Assaulted, 20 YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1911) (arguing that the law of self-defense is "older than the
law itself" and that self-defense is "the natural and inalienable right of every human being, and is to be
held sacred and inviolable by every law of human or civil institution"). The battered women's
movement appropriated self-defense in cases appearing in the 1970s. See MacPherson, supra note 20;
Brenda L. Russell & Linda S. Melillo, Attitudes Toward Battered Women Who Kill: Defendant
Typicality and Judgments of Culpability, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 219, 220 (2006) (explaining that
self-defense is the most common defense plea for murder or manslaughter of an abusive partner); see
also Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence in Federal Court: Abused Women as Victims, Survivors, and
Offenders, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 91, 91 (2006) (discussing how victims' advocates turn away from
women offenders except where battered woman syndrome rescues the woman's status as victim).
22. Defenses for battered women in Canada have also developed largely within the self-defense
context. See Martha Shaffer, Coerced into Crime: Battered Women and the Defence of Duress, 4 CAN.
CRIM. L. REv. 271, 307-08 (1999) (lamenting the lackluster legal consideration of battering for purposes
other than self-defense).
23. While non-confrontational cases have generated significant interest among legal scholars, the
majority of cases in which battered women were killed were in fact confrontational. Maguigan, supra
note 19, at 397.
24. Sarah Baseden Vandenbraak, Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force To Prevent
Intramarital Assaults, 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 643, 658-60 (1979) (proposing an alternative
definition of self-defense that eliminates the elements of imminence and duty to retreat and introduces
the element of necessity).
25. See Maguigan, supra note 19, at 386 (discussing the scholarly focus on reforming evidence
rules for cases in which a defendant presents a history of abuse).
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and co-opting traditionally "male" defenses, such as provocation.2 Holly
Maguigan's influential work on judicial discretion has highlighted the limited
effectiveness of such reform proposals, demonstrating that unfair decisions are
often attributable to improper application of the law by trial judges.27 Court
watch programs offer one potential solution to this institutional problem. These
programs mobilize volunteer observers to observe judicial proceedings where
domestic violence is an issue.28 Unfortunately, court watch programs have no
supervisory capacity where plea bargains are concerned. 2 9 The overwhelming
use of plea bargaining, in up to ninety percent of criminal cases, significantly
diminishes the relevance of court watch programs for battered women charged
with crimes. 3 0 This reality necessitates the gradual evolution of battered
women's defense theories in order to ensure more favorable pleas. That plea
bargains have become so commonplace suggests that defendants could enjoy
greater success if their evidence is tailored to be convincing to judges as well as
unsupervised prosecutors and defense attorneys.
Concurrently with these developments, the battered woman syndrome was
becoming an increasingly popular weapon in combating harmful perceptions
about battered women. The reach and significance of battered woman
syndrome can hardly be overstated. 3 1 For its development, Lenore Walker, the
architect of battered woman syndrome, interviewed 400 battered women and
caseworkers.32 As part of this pioneering research, Walker collected extensive
information regarding the thoughts, behaviors, and feelings of the battered
women she examined.33 Battered woman syndrome is roughly a synthesis of
Walker's extrapolations from this data.34 By delivering a more nuanced view of
the battered woman, Walker's syndrome aims to refute harmful perceptions
26. See, e.g., Brenda M. Baker, Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women Who Kill, 11 CAN.
J.L. & JuRis. 193, 206 (1998).
27. Maguigan, supra note 19, at 447-50.
28. See, e.g., Sarah Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A
Normative Construct, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 232 (2003).
29. See id. at 235 (discussing how court watch programs exercise surveillance over proceedings
held in front ofjudges).
30. MARC L. MILLER & RICHARD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDUREs 1107 (3d ed. 2007). On the
other hand, court watch programs can be expected to enjoy continued success in overseeing protective
orders or custody hearings. See, e.g., Barbara Brotman, Caring Eyes Focus on Domestic Violence Court,
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 4, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-02-04/news/0902030963 I_domestic
-violence-court-court-system-court-watch.
31. See Russell & Melillo, supra note 21, at 219 (describing BWS as "the most sophisticated theory
to capture the plight of women who are assaulted by their intimate partners").
32. Lenore E.A. Walker, Psychology and Law, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1170, 1183 (1993). For a more
comprehensive discussion of the syndrome and its shortcomings, see generally Alafair S. Burke,
Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman,
81 N.C. L. REv. 211 (2002).
33. See Walker, supra note 32, at 1172-73.
34. Id
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about the thoughts and behaviors of battered women.35 Most importantly, the
syndrome creates a prototypical battered woman, constructed around narratives
provided by the study's subjects. In order to avoid overgeneralization, Walker
expanded the syndrome to be applicable in a variety of disparate battering
relationships.36 In order to preserve the theory's coherence, Walker attempted
to unify the various types under an umbrella of common psychological and
neurological symptoms.3 7
Unlike many of the piecemeal approaches advanced by reformers, the
syndrome was theoretically equipped to defend battered women from a variety
of criminal charges.38 Nevertheless, differences exist in the ability of the
syndrome to diminish the culpability of certain battered women, which some
scholars speculate reflects a sympathy premium afforded to some women but
not others.39 Battered women who retaliate against a batterer are likely to be
viewed more sympathetically than those charged with harming an innocent
third party, for example.40 Empirical evidence suggests a leading role for a
related concept, empathy, in obtaining positive outcomes for battered women
on trial.41 Battered women charged with crimes related to retaliation may be
enjoying better legal outcomes to the extent that men can empathize with taking
a defensive action. Significant disparities exist between men and women in
42deciding guilt for battered women, and perhaps this type of empathy in the
self-defense context explains this gap. However the syndrome operates, any
successor or supplanting theory must be attentive to the way the syndrome
accomplishes either mitigation or exculpation. If empathy is impossible, the
defense must appeal to either sympathy or scientific authority.
Despite its pervasiveness and perceived benefits, the battered woman
syndrome has not been without its critics.43 Feminists, experts, and jurists alike
have voiced their concerns about the doctrine and its implications for battered
35. See Burke, supra note 32, at 222-23 (discussing how Walker described domestic violence as
occuring in cycles and how these cycles provided explanations for otherwise counterintuitive behavior,
such as staying with an abuser).
36. See Walker, supra note 32, at 1182 (discussing four different cycles of violence).
37. These symptoms include a dysregulated fight-or-flight response with dissociation and changes
in memory and cognition. Id. at 1185-87.
38. Burke, supra note 32, at 250 (describing the invocation of the syndrome in various criminal
contexts outside of retaliation against a batterer).
39. Id. This sympathy premium may reflect invidious racial and economic bias, and, as such, it is
an unacceptable outcome of contemporary jurisprudence in the area of battered women.
40. See, e.g., id.
41. See generally Karyn M. Plumm & Cheryl A. Terrance, Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact
of Expert Testimony and Empathy Induction in the Courtroom, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 186
(2009).
42. Regina A. Schuller & Sara Rzepa, Expert Testimony Pertaining to Battered Woman Syndrome:
Its Impact on Jurors' Decisions, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 668 (2002) (demonstrating that women
viewed testimony regarding abuse more favorably than men and were more sympathetic toward women
defendants).
43. For a concise summary of the history of attacks made against the syndrome, see Kit Kinports's
discussion "Bashing the Battered Woman Syndrome." Kinports, supra note 17, at 168-73.
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women and women generally.44 In 1997, David Faigman and Amy Wright
went so far as to portend the imminent demise of the syndrome. 4 5 In spite of
this trenchant opposition, legal actors remain reticent, to say the least, about
reigning in the use of the battered woman syndrome. 46 Kathleen Ferraro
attributes the syndrome's enduring influence to its compatibility with norms of
heterosexual femininity. 4 7 By comporting with notions of women as helpless
victims rather than active survivors, the syndrome fits squarely within a
masculinist legal culture.48 These notions are conveyed through the court's
willingness to decide cases depending on how sympathetic they deem a
particular defendant.49 By selectively repudiating certain defendants based on
how closely they conform to the expectations of a male decision-maker, it is
conceivable that preconceptions about battered women were given legal effect.
Explanations like these thoughtfully reflect theories advanced by feminist
thinkers such as Gloria Steinem in other contexts. Steinem had posited that
Freud's acceptance by the public was catalyzed by a desire to reframe
religiously rooted biases against women as empirically verifiable truths,
supported by hard science.5 0
Kathleen Ferraro and Alafair Burke, two significant scholars in the area of
domestic violence, highlight the syndrome's unfortunate compatibility with
chauvinistic perceptions about women in abusive relationships. Their
explanations for the syndrome's persistence cannot account for why the
syndrome-and not any of a number of alternative defense theories-would be
the preferred vehicle for disseminating problematic perceptions about battered
women. To fully explain this phenomenon, I postulate that the syndrome is
44. See, e.g., Ferraro, supra note 2, at 114 (discussing a joint report by the Department of Justice
and the Department of Health and Human Services, published in 1996, in which legal and psychological
experts recommend abandoning the battered woman syndrome in favor of a more global accounting of
abuse, which they describe as "battering and its effects").
45. David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 70 (1997) (chronicling "the rise and fall of the battered woman syndrome").
46. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 32, at 221 ("Although not universally embraced by legal
commentators, Walker's description of battered women and her labeling of them as syndromatic has
found widespread acceptance. For example, the theory is taught to counselors, police officers,
prosecutors, parole board officials, and social-service providers to improve the quality of their responses
to domestic violence. In an unusual expansion of resources to assist indigent criminal defendants, the
federal government at one time funded the development of training materials to facilitate the use of
expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome in criminal cases." (internal citations omitted));
see also id. at 247 ("Courts have largely ignored the flaws in the scientific research underlying the
battered woman syndrome theory and have held that scientific evidence regarding the syndrome is
sufficiently reliable to meet evidentiary standards.").
47. Ferraro, supra note 2, at 125.
48. Id. at 111.
49. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 32, at 249 (discussing the importance of sympathy in motivating
decisions in battered women's cases).
50. Compare Gloria Steinem, Moving Beyond Words, Address at the Ford Hall Forum (May 12,
1994), available at http://fora.tv/1994/05/12/GloriaSteinem MovingBeyondWords, with FIONA E.
RArrr & SUZANNE ZEEDYK, THE IMPLICIT RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: WOMEN AND
SYNDROME EVIDENCE 85-86 (2000) (describing the "guise of scientific objectivity").
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favored in large part due to the legal system's infatuation with scientifically
authoritative explanations. Defense experts prefer it because it associates the
charged act with illness, and this association generally absolves the afflicted
actor of responsibility.5 1 No single theory purporting to describe battered
women would accumulate as much facially credible scientific evidence as the
battered woman syndrome. Because no strong competing theory emerged, the
syndrome's central place in the defense of battered women remained secure.
As the debate over the representation of battered women was unfolding,
neuroscientists and neuroethicists were raising poignant questions about the
philosophical underpinnings of the criminal justice system. While those who
subscribed to a highly deterministic view of behavior argued for abolishing the
punishment of criminality-producing brain dysfunction, others rejected this
view-claiming instead that even brain disordered individuals retain their
52ability to choose from among more or less culpable actions. As jurists and
commentators seek to arrive at some compromise between these two positions,
there has been a suggestion that neurobiology could influence criminal law
without entirely revolutionizing it.53 Amanda Pustilnik recommends a more
focused application of neurobiology to the law. In line with Pustilnik's
recommendations, a description of the battered woman through the lens of
neurobiology should integrate, not eschew, longstanding notions of
culpability. 54 The benefit of using neurobiological evidence for battered
women defendants lies with its ability to corroborate other evidence and satisfy
law's appetite for rigorous scientific theory with a solid empirical backing.
Supplementing defense theories with neurobiological evidence is an
incremental change that also offers the rigorous scientific framework
commentators argue battered woman syndrome is lacking. While the claims
made by the syndrome diverge in many respects from the claims supported by
neurobiology, both use empirically based scientific theories to attempt
mitigation of the battered woman's culpability. To be sure, neurobiological
evidence could give rise to an updated and reinforced battered woman
syndrome just as easily as it could stand alone as a scientific component of
battering and its effects.55 However it is eventually incorporated, the benefit of
51. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 166, 169 (2006) ("The concepts of illness and disease have powerful associations in
our culture, most of which are inconsistent with the sufferer's responsibility for the features of the
illness.").
52. Compare Adrian Raine, Psychopathy, Violence, and Brain Imaging, in VIOLENCE AND
PSYCHOPATHY 35 (Adrian Raine & Jos6 Sanmartin eds., 2001), with Morse, supra note 51, at 171.
53. Pustilnik, supra note 10.
54. Id.
55. Several prominent figures have called for the replacement of the battered woman syndrome
with the more holistic phrase: "testimony on battering and its effects." Sue Osthoff & Holly Maguigan,
Explaining Without Pathologizing: Testimony on Battering and Its Effects, in CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 225, 227, 229-32 (Donileen R. Loseke, Richard J. Gelles &
Mary M. Cavanaugh eds., 2d ed. 2005).
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using neurobiological evidence will certainly redound to the battered woman
defendant. The potential for neurobiological evidence to do damage to a
battered woman's agency and self-determination is a serious concern; some
feminist commentators, however, have resolved similar issues in favor of more,
not less, discourse about such topics. To the extent that neurobiological
evidence for battered women is considered an integral aspect of the general
body of neurolegal jurisprudence, battered women will be the beneficiaries of
increased acceptance of neurobiology in the courtroom. If, on the other hand,
battered women are forced to rely on the contentious scientific claims of the
syndrome, they may actually be imperiled by law and society's increasing
invocation of neurobiology-based accounts of behavior. Thus, the defense of
battered women stands at a precipice. In the absence of an updated
understanding of battering's effects, defense attorneys may have to choose
between retaining an unappealing syndrome or replacing it with an untested
alternative (in the form of sole reliance on social context evidence). As judges
and juries become more exposed to rigorous theories of neurobiology's role in
determining behavior, they can be expected to grow in their skepticism toward
the controversial claims of the battered woman syndrome. Bringing the defense
of battered women into congruence with contemporary neurobiological
evidence offers a strong and objective foundation for limitless claims to
mitigation and exculpation.
PART II. SYNDROMES, SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY
Since its inception, the battered woman syndrome has had a central role in
the defenses of battered women accused of crimes. The syndrome is roughly a
synthesis of data collected about battered women and the authors' various
theories intended to account for apparent trends in this data.57 The syndrome
can be thought to function through two distinct avenues: indirectly, by
constructing (and reconstructing) society's conceptions about battered
women,58 and directly, by presenting empirical evidence to decision-makers
56. See, e.g., Lori G. Beaman, Women's Defences: Contextualizing Dilemmas of Difference and
Power, 9 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 87, 96 (1998); Margaret G. Spinelli, Maternal Infanticide Associated
with Mental Illness Prevention and the Promise of Saved Lives, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1548 (2004).
Premenstrual dysmorphic disorder (PMDD) and premenstrual syndrome (PMS) are highly related to
neurobiological evidence, as both implicate neuroendocrinological control over decision-making. There
is at least some feminist support for using PMDD and PMS in legal settings for their mitigating or
exculpating potential. The issues raised by pathologizing and stigmatizing battered women are further
explored in Section V.A, infra.
57. For example, the syndrome sought to explain, among other things, why battered women would
stay in abusive relationships, why they would cover up for their abusers, whether they provoke their
abuse, and other questions that had yet to be explored in any meaningful way. LENORE E.A. WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
58. Through her work, Melissa Hamilton has attempted a deconstruction of the battered woman
defendant. MELISSA HAMILTON, EXPERT TESTIMONY ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A DISCOURSE
130 [Vol. 23:117
2011] Achieving Peace of Mind 131
such as judges or jurors. Operating in the former capacity, the syndrome relies
on education and media penetration to subtly massage society's notions about
battering and its effects. 59  This massaging is accomplished through
normalizing the behaviors of battered women60 and providing a convenient
vernacular to describe their experiences. The language of the syndrome
includes various concepts susceptible to ambiguation, such as breaking
someone's will,61 being a hostage,62 learned helplessness, 63 and psychological
paralysis.
To support the idea that battered woman syndrome operates by
constructing social knowledge, I refer to the temporal trends in the findings of
65Follingstad et al. In this 1989 study, mock jurors from a pool consisting of
388 college students were asked to pick a verdict in a case where a battered
woman kills her batterer.66 More subjects chose "not guilty by self-defense"
than "not guilty by reason of insanity"-regardless of whether expert testimony
was presented.67 This result was contrary to an analysis conducted eight years
earlier, which showed jurors disproportionately believed that battered women
who committed violent crimes were in some way insane. 6 This shift from
more to less pathologizing suggests that the conceptions of jurors about
battered women have been modified to accommodate the self-defense narrative
made popular through numerous media accounts of battered women.
ANALYSIS 23-24 (2009). The analysis in this Article continues this discussion by unpacking the socially
constructed elements of the battered woman syndrome. While Hamilton's analysis implies that society
constructs the battered woman as being ill, locating the problem within her, rather than within society,
this Article takes an alternate position: the syndrome has enabled a social construct that, while
substantively imperfect, has contributed to the success of some battered women in criminal cases. It is
debatable whether a legal system so devoted to upholding the ethos of personal responsibility could
recognize the crime of a battered woman as a crime of society.
59. The entanglement of the battered woman's counterintuitive behaviors with popular psychology
has turned battered women into somewhat of a cultural curiosity, often producing a maelstrom of media
coverage for certain cases. See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?
When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 76 (2008) ("Over the past thirty years, the public,
the media, and the legal system have coalesced around a stereotypical image of victims of domestic
violence."); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family
Violence, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1665, 1679 (1990) (discussing the way in which the testimony of a battered
woman, Hedda Nussbaum, was televised to audiences all over New York City-reaching the level of a
soap opera).
60. See Ferraro, supra note 2, at 125 ("The battered woman syndrome does not just describe a set
of behaviors that develop in response to battering by an intimate partner. It creates a social
understanding of the effects of battering that influences responses and establishes expectations.").
61. Hunt v. State, 753 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
62. United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Once battered women believe
themselves to be helpless victims of abusive men, they behave like hostages and link themselves to their
captors out of fear. . . .").
63. See infra Section II.B.
64. Thigpen v. State, 546 S.E.2d 60, 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
65. See generally Diane R. Follingstad et al., Factors Predicting Verdicts in Cases Where Battered
Women Kill Their Husbands, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 253 (1989).
66. Id. at 257-59.
67. Id. at 265.
68. Id. at 256.
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Further evidence of the syndrome's influence on the battered woman
construct derives from evidence that battered woman syndrome testimony is
becoming less relevant, less necessary, and more integrated within the jury's
general base of knowledge. In 2002, Schuller and Rzepa showed that mock
jurors who heard expert testimony returned very similar verdicts to those who
had not.69 While this work demonstrates the syndrome's ability to engender
certain beliefs about battered women, the trend also suggests that some forms
of expert witness testimony are approaching obsolescence. It remains an open
question whether the shift in jurors' conceptions of battered women was
ushered in by the constructive force of the syndrome or whether they were the
upwelling of a broader feminist movement. 70
Where the syndrome has been unable to dislodge certain notions about
battered women, it attempts to invoke authority through theoretical frameworks
backed by empirical data to support its counterintuitive assertions. Aside
from providing a convenient language to describe battered women, the
syndrome also delivered a deliberately theoretical framework that adopted
concepts such as mathematically precise cycles, dynamic equilibria, and
thresholds.72 The syndrome's attempt to put itself on equal footing with more
quantifiable physical phenomena is perhaps intentional, as many of the claims
the syndrome makes were later connected by Lenore Walker to theories of
human physiology and neuropsychology.73
The scientific strength of the battered woman syndrome's claims is tied up
in the syndrome's empirical evidence: the number of times a battered woman
responded in the way consistent with the syndrome, the degree to which the
battered woman embodies the theory's predictions, the support the theory finds
in studied populations-all contribute to the power of the syndrome. For those
jurors who have not become acquainted with the syndrome's construction of
the battered woman, the empirical evidence serves an important function: to
69. Schuller & Rzepa, supra note 42, at 664-65 (finding a non-significant difference in the verdict
distribution across the expert and no expert conditions). But see Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A.
Hastings, Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert Evidence, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1996) (in which students, as opposed to non-students, were more favorable
to the woman's claim in the expert condition).
70. Support for the latter conclusion comes from a line of cases predating the battered woman
syndrome, in which women who retaliated against their batterer were nonetheless acquitted. See
MacPherson, supra note 20.
71. For instance, Lenore Walker uses firsthand accounts of over four hundred battered women and
caseworkers to refute the myth that women masochistically provoke their batterers. Lenore E. Walker,
Who Are the Battered Women?, 2 FRONTIERS: J. WOMEN STuD. 52, 54 (1977). Walker consistently
defers to numerical data and quantitative methods of data presentation to combat conventional thinking
about battered women. See generally Walker, supra note 32, at 1181-85 (using statistics and graphs to
represent various battering cycles).
72. For a summary of these, as well as evidence of Lenore Walker's sustained reliance on such
concepts, see Walker, supra note 32.
73. Id. at 1186-90 (making reference to memory distortion, the parasympathetic nervous system,
and the "fight or flight" response).
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quickly and forcefully convince. In one study, subjects presented with a
general expert testifying about battered women were more than twice as likely
to convict of murder as those subjects who heard a scientific expert discuss the
battered woman syndrome. 75 This is strong evidence of the battered woman
syndrome's empirical force in action.
In the remainder of this section, I argue that the battered woman syndrome,
with its dubious claims to scientific validity, stands much like a skyscraper
built on a sandbar. Despite its tendentious assertions about battered women, the
syndrome offers little in the way of valid science to support its central theory.
Secondarily, I explain why this science, however flawed, is foundational for the
syndrome. Finally, I provide examples of judicial attacks on the ex post
methodology underlying battered woman syndrome "diagnoses." As I argued
above, the contributions of the syndrome to educating potential jurors have
likely been realized; now, the scientific foundation for the syndrome must
either be reinforced or its claims to scientific validity abdicated, otherwise even
those who were persuaded by the syndrome previously may become skeptics. 76
The alternatives to the syndrome are briefly explored, and neurobiological
evidence's place within the realm of new approaches is justified.
A. The All-or-Nothing Potential of the Battered Woman Syndrome
The battered woman syndrome facilitates the tweaking of traditional
defense elements to accommodate the characteristics of the prototypical
battered woman.77 Contrary to popular belief, the theory has no exculpatory
force of its own, nor does it constrain the legal purposes of its deployment.
74. If the syndrome derives at least some of its force through a constructivist modality-vis-h-vis
the work of the feminist movement-then cultures where these shifts have been less momentous may
also be more skeptical of non-empirical depictions of the battered woman.
75. Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Its Impact on Jurors' Decisions in Homicide Trials
Involving Battered Women, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 225 (2003).
76. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES,
AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1994) (discussing societal concerns about excusing through
claims of abuse).
77. For example, reasonableness of a battered woman's action is viewed relative to what would be
expected from someone with battered woman syndrome. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STElKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 757 (8th ed. 2007) (stating that
most courts consider syndrome evidence in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's action in
self-defense cases). Legal scholars advocated for the use of syndrome evidence in order to understand
how battered women's predictions about imminence, another requirement for self-defense, would be
affected by violence. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem ofExpert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 195, 211 (1986).
78. It was only several years after the syndrome's claims had been published and invoked in legal
settings that the author, Lenore Walker, addressed the use of the syndrome in legal settings where a
battered woman was accused of retaliating against her abuser. The topic is taken up in less than one
page, and Walker offers a rather perfunctory directive to defense attorneys: establish the battered woman
as being inextricably tied to her abuser. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 220-21 (1980).
Although Walker made various appearances as an expert witness in such cases, the appropriate use of
the syndrome in legal contexts remained open to interpretation.
2011]) 133
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Battered woman syndrome appears to have been repurposed by lawyers and
legal scholars for supporting various defenses.79 The syndrome was most
potent in cases where defenses depended on the satisfaction of certain
subjective elements: the reasonableness of the battered woman's use of force,
the feeling that an attack was imminent. For example, in cases where a
battered woman killed her abuser during a lull in the violence, arguments were
occasionally made unifying imminence with futility of escape, ' effectively
importing the learned helplessness concept from the battered woman syndrome.
Unconstrained by any fixed legal rule or psychological definition,82
attorneys often frame the syndrome in a way that reflects their own conceptions
of who has battered woman syndrome. Given the importance of precedence in
legal practice, defendants could expectably be compared to those who came
83before them. Members of this class of defendants typically have ambiguous
inferences resolved in their favor and are more likely to be excused for their
transgressions. 84 For example, if a woman failed to protect her child from a
batterer, the jury could decide she was an irresponsible parent or, alternately,
that the battering relationship was too intense for her to challenge her batterer
in any meaningful way.85 A woman within the class of battered women with
the syndrome would receive the benefit of the latter inference. The syndrome
may be conceived of, then, as creating a class where membership is attained by
satisfying certain shifting criteria. The mitigating power of the syndrome for a
particular fact correlates with how prevalent that fact is for others in the class.
Thus, a woman whose case could be hurt by a particular fact receives
sympathy, provided that the fact is shared by some other class members.86 The
79. See Burke, supra note 32. The scholarship that produced the battered woman syndrome gave no
indication of its use for defending battered women from criminal charges. Rather, the work focused on
explaining counterintuitive behavior by battered women: staying with an abuser, blaming oneself,
covering up for an abuser. These explanations, it was believed, would create more possibilities for
battered women to receive assistance in escaping their situations. Walker, supra note 71, at 54.
80. KADISH ET AL., supra note 77, at 757-60.
81. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 19 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that "if there is
no escape .. . then the next attack, which could be the fatal one, is imminent").
82. The common law offered little guidance for when battered woman syndrome evidence could be
properly excluded (or included). Maguigan, supra note 19, at 427-28. Similarly, the gold standard for
defining all colors of psychological disorder, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM), offered no definition of the syndrome. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CARSON, JAMES N. BUTCHER &
SuSAN MINEKA, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE (1Ith ed. 2000).
83. Buel, supra note 28, at 296 (explaining how practitioners tend to demand strict adherence to the
syndrome's requirements).
84. See generally Schuller, supra note 75.
85. In People v. Navy, 597 N.E.2d 273, 296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), the appellate court considered the
sufficiency of the evidence convicting a mother who was alleged to have permitted the beating death of
her son by her abusive husband. In that case, the court recognized that although the defendant had been
abused extensively by her husband, an inference of "common design" was reasonable in the killing of
their child.
86. This interpretation varies somewhat from previous interpretations of the syndrome's operation.
In other interpretations, invoking empathy, not sympathy, is described as the critical facet of the
syndrome's operation. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 77, at 220 (describing the syndrome as
uncovering the "public dimension" of the battered woman's experience).
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facts include both pre- and post-crime behavior, trial demeanor, and appearance
or social status.87
The stereotyping that underlies battered woman syndrome has adverse
implications for future defendants who fail to comport with shifting
requirements for class membership and likewise for those women whose facts
may be uncommon to other battered women but nevertheless were an effect of
battering for them. Even more problematic for defendants is the inevitable
creation of a "bad" class of battered women-battered women implicated in
cases where highly incriminating inferences seem tempting to jurors. To tap
into the all-or-nothing potential of the syndrome, battered women attempt to
shoehorn themselves into the class of "good" battered women or else lose the
89mitigating effects of having been battered.
B. Syndrome or Pseudoscience?
Since battered woman syndrome's inception, legal scholars have cast doubt
upon its scientific force. 90 Although the syndrome was developed from
interviews with nearly 700 battered women and service providers, the
methodology for these interviews has been challenged on numerous grounds.
Faigman and Wright outline several significant flaws in the study's design:
interviewers asked leading questions that hinted at the answers desired,
interviewers were aware of the hypothesis, no control group was interviewed,
and the study drew conclusions about battered women, generally, without
regard to the proportion of battered women for whom such conclusions were
supported by the interview data.9 1 The psychological evidence that is the
lynchpin of the syndrome's conceptual framework has yet to be subjected to the
rigorous testing that courts often require of scientific theories before admitting
them to support legal claims.92 Despite these objections, courts appeared
outspokenly unconcerned with the scientific rigor of the syndrome. 93
87. See Russell & Melillo, supra note 21, at 225-26.
88. One such adverse consequence is that battered women will feign certain behaviors or
manufacture facts that place them more "within" the class of battered women. See discussion infra
Section II.C.
89. In some cases, attorneys quibble over the facts necessary to declare a defendant a "battered
woman." These debates often become so contrived that they border on absurd. See, e.g., Pickle v. State,
635 S.E.2d 197, 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (citing the trial court's statement to defense counsel, "[i]t
sounds like ... you're not going to call your client a battered wife or a battered person because that's
going too far, but you're going to pick up instances that occurred and say this is battered.").
90. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 45, at 73 n.37; accord David L. Faigman, The Battered
Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986).
91. Faigman & Wright, supra note 45, at 76-79. For a description of the multiple flaws in the study
design, see id at 77.
92. See id. at 104-05 (questioning law's acceptance of "bad evidence" in lieu of science).
93. Compare Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 822 (Ga. 1997) (regarding syndrome testimony as
admissible where it offers conclusions the jury "could not ordinarily draw for themselves" (quoting
Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (1981)), and State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) ("[W]here
the psychologist is qualified to testify about the battered wife syndrome, and the defendant establishes
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One explanation for the court's willingness to relax scientific standards as
applied to the syndrome is that the syndrome is understood to be a necessary
evil. 94 According to Robert Mosteller, the jury's inability to comprehend the
realities of being a battered woman, combined with the increasing recognition
of the domestic violence epidemic, have compelled courts to retain the
syndrome despite its methodological shortcomings.95 While tempting, this view
fails to account for the syndrome's continued prevalence in light of various
emergent alternative contexts for combating misconceptions about battered
women. 96 Moreover, it cannot account for why some jurisdictions conceive of
the syndrome in more medical terms while others focus on increased
contextualization of the battered woman's situation. 97 What the syndrome
offers over alternatives are theories backed by empirical support. It is likely
that the preservation of the syndrome is due in part to the empirical rebuttal the
syndrome can offer to harmful misconceptions about battered women.
Mosteller may be correct that the syndrome is retained because of its ability to
shield a sympathetic defendant from undeveloped intuitions about abuse.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the syndrome is the singular
comprehensive scientific account of battering backed by a substantial amount
of empirical evidence.
Because the syndrome's theoretical assertions are so multifaceted,
challenges to the syndrome must be particularized. One of the critiques yet to
be fully explored is the battered woman syndrome's specious reliance on
learned helplessness,98 a foundational feature of the battered woman syndrome
imported from Martin Seligman's canonical studies of male canines. 9 9 Learned
helplessness is a process by which individuals, after learning of their inability
to control aversive stimuli, discontinue any measures taken to avoid those
stimuli-even at much later times when such avoidance measures would be
successful. 00 By associating battered woman syndrome with knowledge
acquired through traditional laboratory science, the importation of learned
her identity as a battered woman, expert evidence on the battered wife syndrome must be admitted ...
."1), with Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565, 590 (Tex. App. 1985) (holding that state of the art evidence
was "not adequately demonstrated to the court, and because of inadequate foundation the proposed
opinions would not aid the jury" (quoting Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981))).
94. Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE
L.J. 461,487 (1996).
95. Id
96. Alternatives include defenses based on "battering and its effects" and social agency framework
evidence. See infra Section 11.D (discussing the various alternatives to the syndrome).
97. See infra Section II.C (distinguishing between states that connect the syndrome to PTSD and
those that do not).
98. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42 (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, BATTERED
WOMAN (1979)]. The concept of learned helplessness is revisited in a later version of a book on the
syndrome, along with its converse "learned optimism." LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (2009), at 69.
99. See, e.g., Martin E. Seligman & Steven F. Maier, Failure To Escape Traumatic Shock, 74 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1 (1967).
100. Id.
136 [Vol. 23:117
Achieving Peace of Mind
helplessness was likely intended to color the syndrome with a patina of
scientific legitimacy.101 Anecdotal evidence that learned helplessness, although
ubiquitous, is not an inevitable consequence of battering, has yet to be
confirmed empirically.
Walker's reliance on the Seligman studies undermines her appropriation of
learned helplessness because the Seligman studies failed to consider the effect
of the sex of the animal on its response to inescapable stress.102 As early as
1985, scientists began questioning the assumption that both male and female
animals experienced learned helplessness.' 0 3 More recent work highlights the
pronounced differences between male and female rats in their susceptibility to
learned helplessness.' 04 This work reveals that learned helplessness is largely a
symptom of depression experienced by male, not female rats.105 Studies that
have found some enhanced measure of learned helplessness in female animals
have found it to correlate strongly with the estrous cycle. 106 Studies of battered
women have yielded disparate results, and regardless, such studies are
unavoidably wrought with problems in their experimental design.o 7 If the
syndrome relies on its empirical foundation to receive favorable treatment from
courts, and this empirical foundation is eroded, so too might the syndrome be
undermined.
C. Psychology Validating the Syndrome
Those utilizing the battered woman syndrome have made a valiant effort to
use the doctrine to satiate the law's appetite for scientific validation.o Perhaps
101. In the 1977 edition of The Battered Woman, Walker analogizes being battered to receiving an
electric shock, drawing upon the "learned helplessness" observation of Seligman. The former represents
a highly heterogeneous class of experiences, while the latter is a traditional laboratory stimuli used in
well-controlled conditioning experiments. Walker writes: "Repeated batterings, like electric shocks,
diminish the woman's motivation to respond. She becomes passive ... she does not believe her response
will result in a favorable outcome, whether or not it might." WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN (1979), supra
note 98, at 49.
102. Seligman & Maier, supra note 99.
103. Hans L. Steenbergen et al., Sex-Dependent Effects of Inescapable Shock Administration on
Shuttlebox-Escape Performance and Elevated Plus-Maze Behavior, 48 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 571,
571 (1990) (describing multiple studies that found no suppression in behavior of female rats after
exposure to inescapable stressors).
104. Christina Dalla et al., Females Do Not Express Learned Helplessness Like Males Do, 33
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1559, 1559 (2008).
105. Id.
106. Jennifer A. Jenkins et al., The Influence of Gender and the Estrous Cycle on Learned
Helplessness in the Rat, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 147, 154-55 (2001) (hypothesizing that estrogen and
its metabolites contribute to the female animal's ability to avoid learned helplessness).
107. Margaret H. Launius & Carol Ummel Lindquist, Learned Helplessness, External Locus of
Control, and Passivity in Battered Women, 3 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 307, 316 (1988) (discussing
the assumptions and shortcomings of learned helplessness research with battered women).
108. In some cases, experts debate how much significance to accord the tacit acceptance of the
American Psychological Association (APA) that the syndrome is a trigger for post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). See infra notes 110-111.
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rightly so, given how instrumental scientific labels have been in imbuing both
social and physical conditions with legal gravitas. 09 By linking up with
recognized psychological disorders, battered woman syndrome has gained
significant credibility. Even if the empirical evidence underlying battered
woman syndrome is unconvincing, advocates of the doctrine could lend it some
scientific validity-however tenuous-by linking it with post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). States, faced with this association, are divided about whether
the syndrome is a form of PTSD or something more open-ended-a suite of
psychological and social effects that arise out of battering. 1 10 Seven states have
stated that the syndrome is a form of PTSD."1  Among states regarding the
syndrome as a form of mental disease or PTSD, some nevertheless treat it as
something different from a mental disease or disorder that would affect legal
culpability.112 The most open-ended interpretations of the syndrome hold that it
has social, psychological and physiological features.' 13 Only one state has
109. See, e.g., Lori D'Agincourt, PET Findings Support Insanity Defense Case, 15 DIAGNOSTIC
IMAGING 45 (1993) (discussing how the presence of an "arachnoid cyst" could lead to a favorable plea
for one murder defendant); Mosteller, supra note 94, at 461 (describing the emergence of so-called
"trash" syndromes that sought to gain purchase with juries through their scientific appeal, no matter how
specious they were).
110. Cases from various jurisdictions point to drastically different definitions of the syndrome. See,
e.g., United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1994) ("psychological condition"); United States
v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1992) ("not a mental disease or defect; rather, battered woman
syndrome is a post-traumatic stress disorder"); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992)
("a mixture of psychological and physiological symptoms . . . make it a medical issue").
111. These states are Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. People v. Evans, 648 N.E.2d 964, 965 n.l (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("The battered woman
syndrome is a type of post-traumatic stress syndrome . . . ." (citation omitted)); Comm. v. Conaghan,
720 N.E.2d 48, 59 (Mass. 1999) ("Rather, battered woman syndrome is considered to be a form of post-
traumatic stress disorder, which is 'an anxiety-related disorder . . . occurring in response to traumatic
events outside the normal range of human experience."' (citation omitted)); State v. Stringer, 897 P.2d
1063, 1069 (Mont. 1995) ("The battered woman's syndrome is recognized as a subcategory of
posttraumatic stress disorder." (citation omitted)); State v. Hagerty, No. E2001-01254-CCA-RIO-CD,
2002 WL 707858, at *3 n.l (Tenn. Crim. App. April 23, 2002) ("The DSMIVdoes not use the phrase
'battered spouse syndrome' or 'battered woman syndrome' to separately describe domestic-type
battering that can lead to posttraumatic stress disorder. For that reason, we shall speak of 'posttraumatic
stress disorder' in this opinion."); State v. Bednarz, 507 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) ("The
battered woman's syndrome is recognized as a subcategory of posttraumatic stress disorder." (citation
omitted)); Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 660 (Wyo. 2000) ("The 'battered woman syndrome' is
defined as a subset under the diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. . . ." (citing WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-203(b) (1999))); see also United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[Blattered
woman syndrome is a post-traumatic stress disorder.").
112. When courts make this move, they seem to be asserting a distinction between the syndrome,
on the one hand, and mental disorders like insanity that would have the potential to bear on culpability,
on the other. This is a rather dubious distinction because it seems to manufacture a problematic
conclusion about the syndrome: that insanity-like conditions such as dissociation do not occur as a result
of battering. See Conaghan, 720 N.E.2d at 59 (acknowledging that BWS is a form of PTSD, but holding
that "the defendant has offered no evidence to show that battered woman's syndrome is a mental disease
or defect that could have prevented her from being held criminally responsible for Garrett's death"); see
also Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 7 (asserting that battered woman syndrome is "not a mental disease in the
context of insanity").
113. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1996) (holding that BWS "has been defined
as 'a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and
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acknowledged that the syndrome may have a physiological or medical
character to it.' 14
Within this psychological framework, there is a general concern that a
battered woman who claims to have the syndrome may simply be malingering
or "working over" her story.115 Even Lenore Walker expressed concerns that
during certain periods, the battered woman may be suggestible to the
psychologist's interpretations.l16 Moreover, when a jurist's intuitions about
behavior contravene explanations given by a psychologist, the expert must be
highly credible-especially since such experts may be viewed with
skepticism. This is further complicated by cases wherein the defendant's
credibility is undermined, and this mistrust "spills over" to the defense's
experts. 118 Jurists may believe that experts are not entirely objective. 119
Occasionally, defendants are even suspected of being groomed to conform to
the syndrome criteria.120 For example, in State v. Bockorny, the court cited to
the following testimony of the defense's expert witness:
Well, it's just been my observation that the longer people are in the
system, criminal justice system, the more they work over their story.
I'm not sure whether it's conscious or unconscious, but it seems to
change. I've noticed that the times I've been able to interview people
very close to the crime, it's a more accurate picture but not always, but
there's a tendency to get a more accurate picture.121
psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives."' (citation
omitted)).
114. Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 7 ("Based upon our independent review of the available sources on the
subject, we believe that the syndrome is a mixture of both psychological and physiological symptoms
but is not a mental disease in the context of insanity"); see also id. at 17 (arguing that the syndrome is a
medical issue).
115. This concern reflects some of the empirical findings in the area. See Randy K. Otto, Bias and
Expert Testimony of Mental Health Professionals in Adversarial Proceedings: A Preliminary
Investigation, 7 BEHAV. SC. & L. 267, 271 (1989) (reporting empirical results that mental health
professionals in criminal cases will testify differently depending on which side retains them).
116. Lenore E. Walker, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in Women: Diagnosis and Treatment of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 21, 22 (1991).
117. Even in cases of well-studied conditions such as mental retardation, defendants may draw the
court's suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to
admit psychiatric testimony because unlike physical debilitation, mental retardation is "difficult to
identify, more difficult to quantify, and more easily feigned").
118. Comm. v. Pike, 726 N.E.2d 940, 949 n.10 (Mass. 2000) ("The judge stated: 'As [the
defendant's] version of the facts is unreliable, [the expert's] opinion that she suffered from battered
woman[] syndrome or was still subject to Loring's pervasive control at the time of her trial, is also
unreliable."' (omissions in original)); Long v. Krenke, 138 F.3d 1160, 1161 (Wis. 1998) ("The court
found that these doctors' opinions deserved little weight because they relied too heavily on affidavits
supplied by Long, including Long's analysis of her own mental condition.").
119. There is a longstanding perception among many lawyers that mental health experts who testify
in extreme cases on behalf of battered women are "hired guns." Faigman, supra note 90, at 633.
120. State v. Bockomy, 863 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
121. Id. at 1299-1300.
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The court held that the prosecutor was entitled to impugn the expert
testimony by attacking the foundation of its claims: namely, interviews with the
defendant after she committed her crime.' 22 Because the court believes
psychological symptoms can be manufactured, and because interviews with the
defendant took place several months after the crime, the prosecution was able
to cast a considerable amount of doubt on the expert's opinion. The trial court's
decision to sentence the defendant to five counts of aggravated murder and one
count of murder was affirmed on the appeal.123 Several other cases illustrate
courts' suspicions about a psychologist's ability to extract truthful statements
from battered women.124  Even where malingering is not a concern,
commentators have cast doubt upon the ability of mental health experts to
reconstruct past mental states based upon later examination.125
As evidenced, the reach of the syndrome benefits significantly from its
commensalistic relationship with psychology. PTSD is recognized by the courts
and highly authoritative institutions including the American Psychological
Association and the National Institutes of Mental Health.126 Backed by
empirical research and forming the basis for a highly prevalent DSM-IV
diagnosis,127 PTSD has been instrumental in a variety of contexts, both lending
credibility to defendants and making them more sympathetic to juries.128 It may
well be the battered woman syndrome's potential to connect battering to a
traditionally recognized disorder, PTSD, that accounts for its persistence in
legal contexts. If this is true, then supplementing the existing empirical
foundation with knowledge gained through neurobiology will further bolster
theories of mitigation, as well as the defendant's appeal to the jury.
122. Id. at 1300.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, No. C046991, 2005 WL 1953364, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 16,
2005) (conviction affirmed) (holding no error in prosecutor stating, on rebuttal, that "no psychologist or
psychiatrist is a lie detector"). When a trial judge determines a battered woman is not credible, the judge
may completely disregard the opinion of a qualified psychiatrist. See, e.g., Comm. v. Pike, 726 N.E.2d
940, 949 n.10 (Mass. 2000).
125. Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13 (1984) ("It is extremely difficult for mental health professionals accurately to
reconstruct past mental states. They must rely on the reports of the person being examined and other
observers, reports that decrease in accuracy as time passes.").
126. J. Vincent Aprile II, PTSD: When the Crime Punishes the Perpetrator, 23 CRIM. JUST. 39, 39
(2009).
127. It is estimated that 6.8% of the population will be afflicted with PTSD during their lifetime.
Jaimie L. Gradus, Epidemiology ofPTSD, NAT'L CTR. FOR PTSD, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professionall
pages/epidemiological-facts-ptsd.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
128. PTSD has been invoked in a variety of contexts to explain the reasonableness of some
conduct. These contexts include home invasion, combat-related trauma, and childhood abuse. See
generally Mosteller, supra note 94, at 463 (describing one use of syndrome evidence as establishing the
reasonableness of conduct).
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D. Alternatives to the Syndrome
Several alternatives have emerged in response to the increasing recognition
of the battered woman syndrome as a problematic doctrine for battered women
defendants. Social framework evidence, which first took hold during the 1980s,
makes social science research relevant to legal fact-findings.129 Where the
battered woman syndrome creates rigid categories for battered women, social
framework evidence presents a viable threat to this taxonomy by unpacking the
complex personal and societal dimensions of battering.' 30
Regina Schuller details various approaches for applying social science
evidence in battered women's cases, all of which place an increased emphasis
on the battered woman's social context, with the spillover effect of de-
emphasizing her psychology.1 31 Narratives centered on social context would
describe "the batterer's domination and control, lack of effective community
alternatives, inadequacy of police response, and risks of leaving."' 3 2 Unlike the
battered woman syndrome, social context evidence is intended to give a more
comprehensive and less stigmatizing contextualization of the battered woman's
experience.133 The increased emphasis on the social context subverts the
narrowing of the syndrome class membership. Social framework makes
battering relevant on an individual scale, as well as an ecological scale, through
a greater consideration of the battered woman's relationships with her family,
economy, and community.
Schuller and Hastings have attempted to provide some empirical insight
into whether expert testimony emphasizing social context would produce
outcomes different from expert testimony on traditional battered woman
syndrome.134 Their study focused on 195 York University undergraduate
students and 202 volunteers who had visited the Ontario Science Centre.135 Of
the latter group, nearly sixty percent had received some form of higher
129. Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework
Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 133, 135 (1989) (describing the goal of social frameworks as
"employing general conclusions drawn from social science research to help evaluate factual issues in a
specific case").
130. Faigman, supra note 90, at 644 (imploring the court to admit testimony about the battered
woman's various circumstances rather than focusing narrowly on her status as having the battered
woman syndrome).
131. Schuller, supra note 75, at 236. For examples of this evidence at work, see People v.
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1996) ("[B]attered women often employ strategies to stop the beatings,
including hiding, running away, counterviolence, seeking the help of friends and family, going to a
shelter, and contacting police. Nevertheless, many battered women remain in the relationship because of
lack of money, social isolation, lack of self-confidence, inadequate police response, and a fear (often
justified) of reprisals by the batterer.").
132. See Faigman, supra note 90, at 644.
133. See, e.g., id (lamenting the way expert witnesses and researchers focus on "the psyche of the
defendant rather than her environment"); Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering
and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, II WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 75, 79-80 (1996).
134. Schuller & Hastings, supra note 69, at 172.
135. Id.
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education (university or above).136 The two types of expert testimony,
syndrome testimony and social framework, had very similar consequences for
decision-making. 13 7 For the non-students, the expert testimony had less bearing
on certain facts about the battered woman, but the verdicts returned were
nonetheless the same.' 38 If, in fact, the social framework evidence is equally
convincing, then it should be preferred over syndrome evidence ceteris paribus,
merely for being less stigmatizing and more general.
Even if an alternative to the battered woman syndrome were adopted, there
could be many unintended consequences of complete departure from the
syndrome toward a new, untested framework. For one, the social context
evidence approach is largely new, appearing in only a few cases compared to
the perennial syndrome testimony. Secondly, the battered woman syndrome is
an important bargaining chip for defense counsel in a case where battering is
alleged.139 The syndrome also forms precedent for habeas relief on the basis of
newly discovered evidence.1 40 Most jurisdictions have not determined how and
whether social context evidence could even be relevant to the defense of a
battered woman.
At the federal level, it appears that courts are recalcitrant in granting even
sentencing departures based on childhood abuse.14' Only when such abuse rises
to "extraordinary" levels will it be sufficient to justify a downward departure in
sentencing a defendant.142  Even absent these legal shortcomings, the
persuasiveness of testimony on battered women has been shown to vary among
groups by education and age, among other things.143 For the time being, social
framework evidence may best operate outside the courtroom to revise our
intuitions about battered women, or within sentencing proceedings, where the
constraints on admissibility are significantly relaxed.
Additionally, some battered women's defenses involve claims of
dissociation, a phenomenon wherein a person's perceptions do not align with
136. Id
137. See generally id. at 179-81.
138. Id at 179.
139. See, e.g., Ting Ting Cheng, Notes from the Field: Challenges of Indigent Criminal Defense, 12
N.Y. CITY L. REv. 203, 252 (describing how the use of battered woman syndrome served as an
important strategy for obtaining plea bargains); see also In re Nourn, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 45 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (quoting an expert, Dr. Wexler, as stating that "domestic violence and its effects" is
synonymous with "battered woman's syndrome").
140. See, e.g., Comm. v. Conaghan, 740 N.E.2d 956, 959 (Mass. 2000); Comm. v. Pike, 726
N.E.2d 940, 948 (Mass. 2000).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 417 F.3d 326, 334 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Thus, we adopted these
high standards in Rivera not because-as the government inappropriately suggests-victims of child
abuse might exaggerate or stretch the truth, but rather because it is the sad fact that so many defendants
have unfortunate pasts and we cannot apply a disfavored departure to many or most defendants."
(citations omitted)).
142. Id
143. See generally Schuller & Hastings, supra note 69.
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his or her thoughts.'" Indeed, dissociation is understood by psychologists as an
important mechanism for individuals to avoid the harmful consequences of
acknowledging their trauma.1 45 A defense based solely on social context
evidence would offer no account of dissociation, other than that it happens. To
present an objective account of dissociation, the battered woman could either
demonstrate similarity with others who also claimed dissociation, or
alternately, show that she had a neurochemical profile that would produce a
dissociative state. 146
Far from eschewing an objective scientific approach in favor of more
subjective testimony, experts and courts seem to be on a quest for accurate
science to describe a battered woman's experiences.1 47 Although much can be
learned about battered women through their testimony and the testimony of
other witnesses, the potential unassailability of objective scientific evidence
makes it a highly desirable feature of a legal defense. 148 At present, psychology
evidence offers an attractive source of evidence because its claims can be
144. See, e.g., Dunn v. Roberts, 768 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (Kan. 1991) (granting a new trial where
defense counsel failed to pursue experts on the dissociative response, inter alia).
145. Dissociation has taken on various meanings over time. In the context in which I employ the
term, it is a measure encompassing how perceptually disconnected an individual is from his or her
environment. J. Douglas Bremner et al., Measurement of Dissociative States with the Clinician-
Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS), 11 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 125, 126 (1998). This
clinical manifestation of dissociation is more general than some definitions that describe it as an
intentional coping mechanism. JEROME L. SINGER, REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION 262 (1990)
(defining dissociation as "short-term refusal to perceive responsibility for one's own acts or feelings");
accord Walker, supra note 116, at 26 (describing dissociation as a learned rather than involuntary
response to stress).
146. Rachel Yehuda has suggested that a specific neuroendocrine profile may underlie other
disorders of the allostatic response, such as PTSD. Rachel Yehuda, Current Status of Cortisol Findings
in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 25 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS NORTH AM. 341 (2002).
147. The Federal Judicial Center has increased science training opportunities for district court
judges and also publishes a handbook on scientific evidence. See Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein,
Whither Daubert? Reliable Resolution ofScientifically-Based Causality Issues in Toxic Tort Cases, 50
RUTGERS L. REv. 563, 565 (1998); accord Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) ("[C]ases
presenting significant science-related issues have increased in number . . . .") (Breyer, J., concurring);
Kristie Kline, Comment, Frye Remains the Standard for Determining the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in Pennsylvania Courts. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 40 DUQ. L. REV. 429,
445 (2001) (predicting that technological advances will lead to more science in the courtroom). Lenore
Walker, too, appears to recognize the value in biological explanations. In her latest edition of The
Battered Woman Syndrome, Walker describes the involvement of "biological neurotransmitters" and the
autonomic nervous system in sustained trauma. LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME 413 (2d ed. 2000). Walker stops short, however, of implicating physical abuse or chronic
stress in altered cognitive processing, and omits any discussion of elevated basal levels of stress, which I
discuss in Section III.B. For example, despite the significant controversies surrounding PTSD and its
physiological correlates, Walker cites only one such study. Id. at 256 (describing a study by Charney et
al. as finding "changes in the levels of some neurotransmitters associated with PTSD").
148. As a historical matter, it may have been the scientific character of the battered woman
syndrome that insulated defendants from the paroxysms of media outlets lambasting courts for
permitting battered women to engage in what many described as vigilante justice. See, e.g., Elisabeth
Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman's Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: The Battered Woman as
Vigilante, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 141 (1995); Helen Birch, Women: Down by Law-Helen Birch Asks
Ann Jones, Author of Women Who Kill, About the Gender Divide in Homicide, GUARDIAN, Aug. 7,
1991 (discussing the response of the media to what it termed "vigilante justice" in battered women's
acquittals).
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molded to accommodate the statutory elements of a legal system that focuses
largely on mental state-a legal system in which there is some ambiguity about
how such mental state is proven. Ambiguity in the way intent is defined, in
conjunction with the legal system's emphasis on philosophical notions of "free
will," has turned psychology into a deus ex machina for ascertaining thoughts
and intents in battered women's cases. Indeed, the fluidity of psychological
assessment permits various conclusions about a defendant to enjoy some degree
of legitimacy and a high degree of potential utility. A purely psychological
treatment inevitably fails to reflect the corporeal context in which battering
occurs. Domestic violence is not merely a suite of psychological states, fit to
challenge or corroborate subjective appraisals of fear and anger. By omitting
facts regarding shared and evolved biological responses to abuse, a purely
psychological approach inevitably paints the battered woman as somehow
differently weaker or more susceptible than the reasonable person; in reality,
any reasonable person could be expected to respond similarly under the same
neurobiological circumstances. A greater appreciation of how the brain
functions under persistently threatening circumstances and physical violence
may reveal that the battered woman and the person judging her are actually
more similar than previously thought.
PART III. NEUROBIOLOGY AND THE EFFECTS OF BATTERING
When a battered woman presents herself to a doctor, the first examination
may be of her brain: X-rays or CT scans checking for head trauma. Ideally, this
meeting takes place relatively soon after a battering incident occurs. In practice,
when a battered woman is visited by an expert witness, possibly many months
after her incarceration, the first examination will be of her mind: a battery of
psychological tests administered to uncover any sign of dysfunction. A doctor
may testify summarily about the battered woman's injuries; a psychologist will
testify about the battered woman's behavior and cognitions. Why has testimony
by these two failed to merge in any meaningful way? Obviously, the law places
one substantial limitation. Generally, the law focuses less on what is happening
in the brain and more on the outward behaviors of an individual.149 One
impediment has certainly been the legal system's complacency toward the
continued use of the battered woman syndrome. The syndrome's alliance with
psychology has allowed it to curry favor with a legal system where psychology
is viewed as the science of first resort for ascertaining intents and thoughts at
the time of an alleged crime. The inherent ambiguity in language and law's
149. Cases involving battered women as defendants have invoked BWS as fulfilling this function.
As the court wrote in Myers, "involved here is the matter of insight into the operations of defendant's
mind, which defendant seeks to illuminate and explain through the testimony of experts who have had
the opportunity to examine her." State v. Myers, 570 A.2d 1260, 1266 (N.J. 1990).
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general reliance on societal intuitions about behavior to determine mens rea
have made psychology the preferred plane of intersection between science and
criminal law.
When assessing the culpability of an individual, jurists often use the same
language that a scientist or medical professional would use in assessing the
effects of battering on an individual: capacity, judgment, awareness. so While
an attorney may argue lack of judgment to defend an accused adolescent
perpetrator, a neuroscientist would argue that an individual's judgment is
impaired by repeated instances of head trauma.'5 1 Despite their shared
vocabulary, there is a dearth of legal precedent merging scientific thought on
the effects of battering with the defense of a battered woman who commits a
-152crime.
Neurobiological evidence, much like social framework evidence, could
operate through making neurobiology research relevant to the specific battered
woman on trial. To have any sustained effect on the criminal trials of battered
women, the research must be proffered in such a way as to make it relevant to
some adjudicative fact or cognizable legal argument. To a scientist, such
constraints may seem like a cumbersome requirement, but unlike science, legal
standards exist in a strongly normative universe. While both criminal law and
science are normative, the norms animating criminal law vary depending on the
lawmakers who create it and the judges and jurists who interpret it. Ideally,
science will only be normative in the weak sense, in that norms of accuracy and
repeatability are incidental to the process of science's central truth-gathering
objective. Thus, a neuroscientist's attempt to make her statement relevant to a
jury may be frustrated by the particularized way the jurisdiction interprets mens
rea.' 53 Suppose that the neuroscientist concludes that a schizophrenic defendant
did not act intentionally, because in fact, a sudden and severe chemical
imbalance prompted a hallucination. The neuroscientist may insist that intent
flows from the normal functioning of the prefrontal cortex. The State, however,
may adhere to a more philosophical conception of intent, as in, unless an
individual is insane, the natural consequences of his action are presumed to be
intended. 154 No matter how absurd the results may seem to a scientist, the issue
150. See, e.g., Martha E. Banks, Overlooked but Critical: Traumatic Brain Injury as a
Consequence ofInterpersonal Violence, 8 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 290 (2007).
151. Id. at 291 ("Sustaining a second brain injury before healing an initial brain trauma has been
demonstrated to result in poor memory, poor judgment, inability to perform at the prior level of
achievement, and, in the most severe cases, death.").
152. In response to this deficiency, I have tried to employ language common to both fields. This
Article incorporates scientific facts only insofar as they would be important to an attorney considering
an expert or an academic determining the legal plausibility of a defense stemming from such facts.
153. Mens rea may be understood to be something different depending on how a particular legal
body has weighed competing normative interests, including clarity, responsibility, and predictability,
among others.
154. Debates circulate about whether intent exists where mental abnormality was a factor. Stephen
Morse provides a compelling argument that an act can be intended even in the presence of "rationality or
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is a matter of law decided through successive acts of legislative decision-
making and judicial interpretation. Ultimately, the State perceives mens rea
elements as it deems appropriate, and as such, these elements will vary over
time but always remain within the discretion of the states.' 55
The physical effects of battering on the brain will be understood to mean
the consequences of suffering concussions and other head trauma, occasioned
by the use of physical force. Brain injury may be discovered through screening
by domestic violence advocates as well as with the aid of medical imaging
technology, hence the crucial role of medical professionals.156 In contrast, there
are physiological effects of battering, which may result from any of the
conditions imposed by the battering dynamic: sexual abuse, captivity, threats of
harm, abuse of children and pets. Physiological evidence is difficult to ascertain
without some proxy such as the amount of a hormone in the blood stream of an
individual. It nhay be helpful to think of physical effects as being physical
damage to the structure of an individual-physiological consequences on the
other hand consist of chemical changes within the individual. Occasionally,
physiological changes may result in physical damage, through the action of
chemicals. 157
Bodily and physiological effects are contra-distinguished from a third class
of effects, namely, psychological effects. Not to be given short shrift,
psychological effects serve as a relevant but oftentimes incomplete indicator of
the effects of battering. Because psychological effects are the foundation of the
battered woman syndrome, they are discussed extensively in the literature on
that subject.
self-control problems" because the reasons to avoid criminality are so numerous: "parental, religious,
and school training; peer pressures and cultural expectations; internalized standards ("superego"); fear of
capture and punishment; fear of shame; and a host of others." Going further, Morse asks us to consider,
"Is intentional behavior motivated by a delusion any less 'chosen' than intentional behavior motivated
by rational reasons?" Morse, supra note 125, at 40. The Supreme Court essentially answered this
question in Clark v. Arizona when deciding that Arizona could hold a behavior motivated by a delusion
to nonetheless be intended. 548 U.S. 735, 771 (2006) (accepting Arizona's Mott rule, which prohibits
mental abnormality evidence from being used to challenge the intent needed for a crime, permitting it
only within a more stringent insanity defense). While the Court acknowledged the constitutionality of
Arizona's unique Mott rule, it also left states free to consider mental abnormality evidence as rebutting
the intent needed for a crime. Id. at 778 ("[N]ot every State will find it worthwhile to make the judgment
Arizona has made"). Indiana followed Arizona's example, adopting a similar rule. Marley v. State, 747
N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (2001) (holding that evidence relating to mental defect is only admissible as part of a
complete affirmative insanity defense); accord State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997) (en
banc) (barring evidence of mental impairment, not rising to the level of insanity, from negating mens
rea).
155. In Powell v. Texas, the Court emphatically held: "The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea,
insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have'istorically provided the tools for a constantly shifting
adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral,
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man." 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
156. Special Collection: Traumatic Brain Injury and Domestic Violence: Understanding the
Intersections, supra note 11.
157. This interaction between physical and physiological effects certainly merits careful
examination, but this Article will focus on each in isolation. It should be noted that physical effects of
battering may magnify physiological effects of battering and vice versa.
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To imbue neurobiology with legal relevance, it is necessary to first
acknowledge that the brain is the source of all behavior. This notion is not a
novel concept in the law. Insanity, diminished capacity and intoxication
defenses all presume decreased culpability for individuals with a brain
"defect." The brain defect can be organic, as in the case of insanity for a
schizophrenic, or it can be exogenous, as in the case of involuntary
intoxication. Here again, it is important to acknowledge that what science
considers brain damage may not be sufficient or even appropriate evidence to
advance a legal theory premised on brain function.
Upon recognizing that human behavior is determined through the operation
of the brain, the next step in the inquiry focuses on how the brain of a battered
woman is affected by her batterer's abuse. 58 Succinctly, as any organ
responding to its environment, the human brain will be altered by external
forces acting upon it. The duration and extent of that alteration are what should
concern us in ascribing legal significance to brain changes. To say that a
battered woman's brain is altered in some way by her batterer's repeated
punches is simply a statement of scientific fact. For many battered women, the
brain is altered both exogenously, becausc of the physical trauma of battering,
and also endogenously, namely through changes in the levels of certain stress
hormones and other biologically relevant chemicals. How these alterations
manifest themselves in behavioral changes remains an empirical question, one
which I take up in the following Sections.
A. Physical Effects ofBattering
There is no dearth of studies showing that battered women experience head
and face injury as an outcome of battering.159 In one study, 94.4% of 127
battered women seeking medical attention in an emergency department
presented with head, face, or neck injuries.o In another study, 81% of 236
women treated for domestic violence were found to have maxillofacial
injuries. Maxillofacial surgeons likewise report that in a sample of 546
battered women, 67% had been injured by a husband or boyfriend.162 In a
sample of 9057 women who presented for any reason to the emergency
158. See infra Sections III.A-B.
159. In one sample of fifty-three battered women, 92% reported that they had been hit in the head
or face by a partner. Helene Jackson et al., Traumatic Brain Injury: A Hidden Consequence for Battered
Women, 33 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 39, 41 (2002).
160. Howard A. Ochs, Michael C. Neuenschwander & Thomas B. Dodson, Are Head, Neck and
Facial Injuries Markers ofDomestic Violence?, 127 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N 757, 757 (1996).
161. Bach T. Le et al., Marillofacial Injuries Associated with Domestic Violence, 59 J. ORAL &
MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 1277, 1277 (2001).
162. Nicholas Zachariades, Fani Koumoura & Elina Konsolaki-Agouridaki, Facial Trauma in
Women Resulting from Violence by Men, 48 J. ORAL & MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 1250, 1250-53
(1990).
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department of ten major city hospitals, battering was the second most common
means of injury-surpassed only by falls. 163 Head and face injuries often lead
to traumatic brain injury.'6
Between 33% and 50% of women who experience physical violence also
experience sexual violence by their partner.'65 Traumatic injury was found to
be over twice as prevalent in women who were both sexually and physically
assaulted as opposed to just physically assaulted. In addition, women who
were sexually abused were more likely to report neurological symptoms than
those who were only physically abused.16 7
Of the mechanism of injury, Jackson et al. found that 68% of the women
surveyed had reported being severely shaken by their batterer. Additionally,
assaults by fist were demonstrated to be highly common, with 67% of one
sample of 236 domestic violence patients having been injured that way.'6 ' The
total number of fractures was tabulated in this population and they tended to be
disproportionately localized to the middle and lower face, with eighty-two
women (35%) having fractures in those areas.' 70 These types of fractures are
often associated with concussions.171
In a 1999 study examining 256 battered women in emergency departments,
sixty-nine women (27%) had injuries inflicted through the use of a weapon, the
majority of these weapons being blunt objects.17 2 A similar study found that a
weapon was used on thirty-six patients out of 236 (15%) admitted to the
emergency room between 1992 and 1996 for domestic violence. 73 Weapons
and blunt objects are typically more massive than a human fist, delivering more
momentum over a localized area. Thus, the potential for focal sites of brain
injury is higher when weapons are used to inflict damage.
163. Robert L. Muelleman, Patricia A. Lenaghan & Ruth A. Pakieser, Battered Women: Injury
Locations and Types, 28 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 486, 489, tbl.1 (1996).
164. Sharon R. Wilson, Traumatic Brain Injury and Intimate Partner Violence, in INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE: A HEALTH-BASED PERSPECTIVE 183, 183 (Connie Mitchell & Deirdre Anglin
eds., 2009).
165. Ron Acierno, Heidi S. Resnick & Dean G. Kilpatrick, Health Impact of Interpersonal
Violence: Prevalence Rates, Case Identification, and Risk Factors for Sexual Assault, Physical Assault,
and Domestic Violence in Men and Women, 23 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 53 (1997).
166. Collin B. Smikle et al., Physical and Sexual Abuse: A Middle-Class Concern?, 40 J. REPROD.
MED. 347-50 (1995).
167. Jacquelyn Campbell et al., Intimate Partner Violence and Physical Health Consequences, 162
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1157, 1160 (2002), available at http://www.nnvawi.org/pdfs/alo/
Campbell_6.pdf. '1
168. Jackson et al., supra note 159, at 42.
169. Le et al., supra note 161, at 1279.
170. Id.
171. J.R. DeKruijk, A. Twijnstra & P. Leffers, Diagnostic Criteria and Differential Diagnosis of
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 15 BRAIN INJ. 99 (2001).
172. Demetrios N. Kyriacou et al., Risk Factors for Injury to Women from Domestic Violence, 341
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1892, 1894 (1999).
173. Le et al., supra note 161, at 12 79.
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In order to focus in on the specific consequences of the injuries sustained
by battered women, Jackson et al. also reported the neurological effects of
battering on women. Among battered women, 77% reported post-concussive
symptoms and 40% lost consciousness after a battering incident. 174
Additionally, many battered women are likely to suffer multiple instances of
head trauma, rather than a single incident.' 75 A similar study corroborated the
result from Jackson et al., finding concussive symptoms in all of the fifty-two
battered women studied.' 76  These varied studies demonstrate that large
numbers of women experience severe battering-ranging from choking, to
punches to the face, to impacts with blunt objects-and that the recurrence of
such abusive episodes must be closely probed.
Despite the extensive literature documenting the types of injuries sustained
by battered women, few studies have looked at how neurological changes in
these battered women precipitate behavioral and cognitive changes. 7 7 To
rectify this, where appropriate, I have chosen to cite studies of an alternative
group that experiences repeated physical insults to the head, face, and neck:
athletes in full-contact sports. If this analogy seems to overstate the physical
force that an average batterer is capable of delivering, consider the following:
first, the frequency, not the severity, of blows to the head has been correlated
with morphological changes in brain structure;' 78  second, because brain
damage often results from forced rotation of the head, 1 which may be
tempered by an athlete's developed neck musculature or training, even forces
not amounting to an athlete's trained movement may have similar
consequences; third, some injuries, including "complex" concussions, those
characterized by multiple concussive episodes, seem to be more detrimental to
cognitive function than simple concussions.'so
Aside from concussions, battering may also result in hematomas. Studies
involving athletes who experience head injury frequently document instances
174. Jackson et al., supra note 159, at 42.
175. Id. at 40-41.
176. Albert R. Roberts & Jung H. Kim, Exploring the Effects of Head Injuries Among Battered
Women, 32 J. Soc. SERv. RES. 33, 42 (2006).
177. As of 2007, at least eight studies had been conducted on traumatic brain injury in battered
women. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 150, at 292 (stating that "there is scant research on traumatic brain
injury as a consequence of interpersonal violence" and citing eight such studies).
178. Robert L. Heilbronner et al., Neuropsychological Consequences of Boxing and
Recommendations To Improve Safety: A National Academy of Neuropsychology Education Paper, 24
ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 11, 12 (2009) ("[T]he cumulative effects of multiple
subconcussive head blows appear to be the primary cause of neurologic injury in boxers.").
179. Julian E. Bailes & Vincent Hudson, Classification ofSport-Related Head Trauma: A Spectrum
of Mild to Severe Injury, 36 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 236, 236 (2001) ("Energy directed to the head may
cause transmission of force in a rotatory direction, often producing diffuse brain injury with shearing of
the white-matter fiber tracts.").
180. Grant Iverson, Predicting Slow Recovery from Sport-Related Concussion: The New Simple-
Complex Distinction, 17 CLINICAL J. SPORT MED. 31, 31 (2007) (reporting decreased performance on a
variety of neuropsychological measures for individuals having complex concussions).
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of hematomas.' ' Of the hematomas that athletes sustain, Bailes and Hudson
describe epidural and subdural types.182 Epidural hematomas result from large
acceleration-decelerations that occur when the brain strikes a solid object or is
shaken.' 83 Both of these types of abuses have been documented in battered
women. 184 These epidural hematomas are often accompanied by skull
fractures,1s which are also documented in battered women.186 Patients may
also often appear neurologically normal upon examination, but a CT scan
would reveal the true extent of the damage. Subdural hematomas, on the
other hand, have been sustained by football players who had experienced two
mild concussions without any loss of consciousness.' 8 8 These hematomas are
also caused by linear acceleration-deceleration forces but, unlike epidural
hematomas, are less frequently associated with fractures of the skull.189 If these
injuries persist for three weeks, mental disturbances and personality changes
may follow. 190 A third type of head injury, cerebral contusion, is one of the
most frequent among athletes with head injuries.19 Behavioral or mental
effects may follow due to the involvement of the frontal lobe in this type of
injury.192 All three of these types of injuries are diagnosable by CT scan.193
Even when no hematoma or contusion forms, repeated instances of brain injury
may result in increases in intracranial pressure (ICP), which may then result in
behavioral and mental changes.194
Clearly, brain injuries figure prominently into the abuse of battered
women. For these injuries to be relevant in a legal context, however, they must
be related to some behavioral or cognitive consequence. Concussions, also
referred to as mild traumatic brain injuries, are the most common brain injuries
among athletes and their effects on the brain are well-documented.195 Although
concussions vary in severity, it is important to note that loss of consciousness is
not a necessary condition for concussion.' Concussive symptoms are tied to a
range of important neuropsychological changes, including: cerebral cortex
dysfunction;19 7  information-processing abnormalities; difficulty with
181. Bailes & Hudson, supra note 179, at 238.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Wilson, supra note 164, at 190.
185. Bailes & Hudson, supra note 179, at 238.
186. Wilson, supra note 164, at 192.
187. Bailes & Hudson, supra note 179, at 238.
188. Id.
189. Id
190. Id. at 238-39.
191. Id. at 239.
192. Id.
193. See generally id. at 238-40 (describing various types of traumatic intracranial lesions
diagnosable by CT scan).
194. Id. at 238-40.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 241.
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planning and understanding;199 amnesia;200 ,a volatile antagonism against the
environment, other people, and the self;" 201 agitation, confusion, psychosis,
apathy, and other cognitive and behavioral changes.202 In 2008, the New
England Journal of Medicine published an editorial in which the implications
of mild traumatic brain injury for an individual's fear response were discussed:
Mild traumatic brain injury often involves damage to the prefrontal
cortex due to shearing forces of the frontal regions against the skull. It
is possible that a person's capacity to regulate the fear reaction may be
impaired after mild traumatic brain injury because the neural networks
involved in the regulation of anxiety may be damaged as a result of the
mild traumatic brain injury.203
Depending on the index used to measure aggressiveness, marked shifts
toward more aggressive behavior occurred in 11% to 96% of traumatic brain
204
injury ("TBI") victims studied. Tateno et al. used the overt aggression scale,
a highly reliable indicator, to determine that 33.7% of TBI victims
demonstrated significant aggressive behavior within six months from the time
of the injury.205
Conventional wisdom within legal settings is that a battered woman's fear
amounts to a conditioned response to a threatening stimulus. The research
above, however, suggests that in some instances, heightened fear may not
merely be a conditioned response to frightening interactions with a batterer.
Instead, the fear of future battering may actually be exaggerated by the physical
effects of battering and not just the battered woman's perception or memory of
having been battered. Stated more succinctly, the research suggests that a
battered woman who experienced a concussion during her battering will be
more reactive to fear than if she had experienced the same level of battering but
without a concussion.
198. Id. at 240.
199. Roberts & Kim, supra note 176, at 36.
200. Every concussion, regardless of severity, results in some amnesia. Sairah Chachad & Atiya
Khan, Concussion in the Athlete: A Review, 45 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 285, 286 (2006).
201. Roberts & Kim, supra note 176, at 43.
202. Vani Rao & Constantine Lyketsos, Neuropsychiatric Sequelae of Traumatic Brain Injury, 41
PSYCHOSOMATICS 95, 97 (2000).
203. Richard A. Bryant, Disentangling Mild Traumatic Brain Injury and Stress Reactions, 358
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 525, 526 (2008).
204. Amane Tateno, Ricardo E. Jorge & Robert G. Robinson, Clinical Correlates of Aggressive
Behavior After Traumatic Brain Injury, 15 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 155, 155
(2003).
205. Id- at 155-57.
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Aggressive behavior often imperils a battered woman's claim to having
been a victim of abuse. 2 06 The peculiar intuition that someone in fear would be
less likely to act aggressively could be readily combated by science. What if
some aggressiveness is attributable to the consequences of traumatic brain
injury? The study by Tateno et al. shows exactly this: patients with closed head
injury scored significantly higher than controls on aggressiveness and tendency
to exhibit aggressive behavior. 2 07 The aggressive group was not significantly
different from the non-aggressive group in a number of important control
measures.208 The aggressive group had a significantly higher frequency of
mood disorders and a greater frequency of frontal lobe lesions.209 The authors
speculate that TBI may concomitantly produce both major depressive disorder
and frontal lobe dysfunction.210 Researchers have demonstrated that battered
women often suffer from major depressive disorder and, as I have demonstrated
here, TBI is also a major component of battering. Previously, the psychological
strain of being in a battered relationship had been understood to cause aberrant
and occasionally hostile behavior-this research reflects that TBI may also play
a role. Currently, if a battered woman is thought to have depression,
psychological examinations are conducted to examine the nature of her malady.
In the future, indications of a depressive condition may also warrant the
involvement of a neurologist or examination of neurological records to detect
battering that may have led to TBI. Where TBI is demonstrated to have existed,
there will be support for the idea that the battered woman's aggression was not
due to some fault of her own, but a biological consequence of her battering.
In addition to aggressive behavior and fear appraisal, changes in decision-
making are also a consequence of brain injury. Koenigs et al., in a 2007 work
published in Nature, demonstrated a significantly higher tendency for
individuals with prefrontal cortex damage to endorse emotionally aversive
utilitarian decisions. 2 1 1 This experiment, with its potentially far-reaching
206. People v. Bolden, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 111, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that because prior
assaults were instances of mutual combat, often initiated by the defendant, no self-protection jury
instruction was warranted for the battered woman); State v. Cramer, 841 P.2d I 11, 1114 (Kan. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that refusal to instruct on BWS was appropriate because of previous violent conduct
between the battered woman and other parties); State v. Higgs, No. 15554, 1992 WL 281348, at *6
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1992) (affirming a murder conviction over the lower court's admitting prejudicial
hearsay, holding no plain error because the evidence showed that the battered woman and her batterer
were engaged in mutual combat). In some cases, prosecutors will exploit a battered woman's
aggressiveness or minor violent acts to show that she was not in fact a "battered woman." Ferraro, supra
note 2, at 117-19. These examples reinforce the rigid delineations that could be broken apart through a
more nuanced examination of aggressiveness in battered women.
207. Tateno et al., supra note 204, at 157.
208. These measures were age, gender, race, years of education, socioeconomic status, or history of
anxiety disorder. Id. at 157. In the month preceding the onset of the patient's aggression, the two groups
were also matched for substance abuse and alcohol use. Id. at 156.
209. Id. at 156-57.
210. Id. at 159.
211. Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral
Judgements, 446 NATURE 908 (2007).
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consequences for defendants with brain injuries, had researchers present
subjects with classical utilitarian dilemmas-asking them to choose between
two alternatives: either commit an emotionally aversive action against one
individual or abstain from acting to the detriment of the general welfare but
avoiding the emotionally aversive act.212 Those individuals with damage to the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex exhibited a statistically significant preference
for the emotionally aversive stimuli over neurologically normal controls, or in
other words, they were not inhibited in their decisions by the emotional content
of the utilitarian act.213 Battered women, who may have damage to the areas
assessed by Koenigs et al., are often faced with utilitarian dilemmas. These
women are forced to choose, for example, between being complicit in the
batterer's abuse of their child or acting to stop him and potentially having
themselves and their child killed.2 14 Research such as that of Koenigs et al.
may be helpful to demonstrate that the batterer's physical abuse, and not moral
depravity on the part of the battered woman, was the catalyst for such
emotionally aversive acts.
B. Physiological Effects of Battering
The physiological effects of battering are best defined by what they are not:
physically visible. Physiology, by definition, entails dynamism that could not
be captured in a single image or scan. Unlike the physical effects discussed
above, these effects would not be visible at the level of the naked eye or even
with the aid of brain imaging technology. To measure the physiological effects,
some proxy is used, for example the concentration of a certain chemical in the
blood. Of course, physiological effects have consequences we can observe once
they manifest themselves as behavioral changes. A helpful analogy might be
212. An example of one of the scenarios presented by the experimenters:
You are the leader of a mountaineering expedition that is stranded in the wilderness. Your
expedition includes a family of six that has a genetically caused vitamin deficiency. A few
people's kidneys contain large amounts of this vitamin.
There is one such person in your party. The only way to save the lives of the six members of
this family is to remove one of this man's kidneys so that the necessary vitamins may be
extracted from it. The man will not die if you do this, but his health will be compromised.
The man is opposed to this plan, but you have the power to do as you see fit.
Would you forcibly remove this man's kidney in order to save the lives of the six vitamin-
deficient people?
Id. app. at 17.
213. Id.at910.
214. In other cases, battered women have chosen to sacrifice their own body parts to protect
themselves from death at the hands of their batterer. In re Nourn, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 42 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) ("Then he wanted me to cut my left pinky off to prove I wouldn't betray him.").
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blood alcohol content. While the amount of undigested alcohol in a person's
blood stream is not visible to us, we can use a breath alcohol testing device to
measure the amount of alcohol in one exhalation. This measurement is a proxy
for the level of alcohol in the person's blood, knowledge of which is useful in
predicting that individual's ability to think, respond, or react in the moment. Of
course, we can suspect intoxication based on the individual's behavior, but the
proxy offers a reliable, objective confirmation. Unlike the physical effects of
battering on the brain, the relationship between the concentration of a certain
chemical in the battered woman's blood and her behavior is much less obvious.
To imbue stress with legal relevance for battered women, the physiological
effects of battering must somehow implicate the brain's ability to regulate
behavior and cognitions.
Rather than anchoring the discussion in amorphous notions of "stress," it is
far more precise to speak of allostatic load.215 This term, coined by the
prominent neuroscientist Bruce S. McEwen, is defined as the "wear and tear"
of persistent exposure to stress or an inability to manage stress effectively. 216
The way individuals manage or respond to stress is defined as allostatic
response.217 As an example, everyone at some point has experienced the stress
created by an impending obligation come due or new responsibility. Our bodies
mobilize a response that allows us to manage this stress. Within a battering
relationship, the unpredictability and escalation of abuse places a tremendous
allostatic load on the battered woman. At certain levels of allostatic load, the
mechanism by which individuals respond to the next stressful event becomes
dysregulated. While helpful in small doses, chronically present stress hormones
are damaging to the prefrontal cortex and hippocampuS218 -areas of the brain
in control of decision-making and judgment. Animal studies suggest that this
damage is reversible in adults but not in children.219 The detrimental effects of
stress are magnified when the individual feels unable to control the stressor-
in this case, the batterer. 220
By recognizing a relationship between allostatic overload and unusual
behavior, we are not presupposing that overloaded individuals are mentally
impaired or insane; rather, this recognition merely acknowledges that recurring
stress can overtax any person's natural, adaptive responses to stress. Recent
work has shown that chronic exposure of the brain to epinephrine and
norepinephrine, two molecules released by the body during a stressful situation,
215. Bruce S. McEwen, Physiology and Neurobiology of Stress and Adaptation: Central Role of
the Brain, 87 PHYSIOLOGY REv. 873, 880 (2007).
216. Id. at 874.
217. Allostasis is defined literally as "achieving stability through change." Id. at 880.
218. Amy F.T. Amsten, Stress in the Brain, NATURE (May 29, 2009),
http://www.nature.com/neurosci/neuropod/index-2009-05-29.html, at 2:06.
219. Id at 7:17.
220. Id. at 5:29.
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can result in loss of important neuronal structures in the prefrontal cortex.221 At
222
the same time, structures in the amygdala actually expand. This coupling of
prefrontal diminution with amygdalar potentiation leads to impaired decision-
making and other consequences for behavior.223 Other studies discussed below
examine the differences between traumatized and non-traumatized groups in
terms of the level of elevation or diminution in certain allostatically relevant
chemicals. Because these chemicals are secreted and taken up as part of myriad
feedback loops, it should be noted that the effect of any one chemical may be
mediated by another in a number of non-obvious ways before it has
consequences for behavior. In describing the findings of such studies, ratios
and trends will be more instructive for juries than straightforward increases or
224decreases. To the extent that such ratios and trends may bear upon the
battered woman defendant's legal theory of defense, I will attempt to relate
them in greater detail here.
In order to make sense of the literature on the allostatic overload of
battered women, a discussion of two chemicals that mediate the allostatic
response is necessary. Perhaps the most familiar of the pair is cortisol, which
popular opinion typically associates with the myriad negative effects of
225stress. Stressful events, perceived by the brain, trigger a set of reactions
within the body that ultimately signal the adrenal cortex to produce cortisol.226
Upon release from the adrenal cortex, cortisol travels through the blood stream
and some of it enters the brain. Cortisol is ubiquitous in the life of an
227
individual, exerting its influence as early as infancy. Not only does cortisol
act early, it acts broadly, having effects on many regions of the brain.228
221. Amy F.T. Arnsten, Stress Signaling Pathways that Impair Prefrontal Cortex Structure and
Function, 10 NATURE NEUROSCI. REV. 410,418 (2009).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 411 (describing a "vicious cycle" where amygdalar potentiation leads to further
impairment of the prefrontal cortex).
224. "Endocrine risk" has been defined as a particular ratio ofcortisol to DHEA and is considered a
predictor of depression and other abnormal psychological processes. I.M. Goodyer et al., Possible Role
of Cortisol and Dehydroepiandrosterone in Human Development and Psychopathology, 179 BRITISH J.
PSYCHIATRY 243 (2001).
225. See, e.g., The Tortured Brain, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 2009 ("Stress such as that caused by
torture releases the hormone cortisol, which can impair cognitive function, including that of the
prefrontal cortex and hippocampus."); David Bjerklie & Michael D. Lemonick, Depression: Evolution's
Role: A Frazzled Mind, a Weakened Body, TIME (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1004080,00.html#ixzz0uqqb8Swm ("Cortisol in particular can weaken the immune
system, potentially making cancer and infectious diseases worse."); see also E. Ron de Kloet Marian
Joels & Florian Holsboer, Stress and the Brain: From Adaptation to Disease, 6 NATURE NEUROSCI.
REV. 463, 464 (2005).
226. The adrenal cortex is a part of the adrenal gland, which is located near the kidneys and
pancreas. William E. Rainey & Yasuhiro Nakamura, Regulation of the Adrenal Androgen Biosynthesis,
108 J. STEROID BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 281 (2008).
227. Assisted delivery methods involving forceps, for example, tend to be traumatic. Infants birthed
this way have higher cortisol responses to subsequent inoculations. Alyx Taylor, Nicholas M. Fisk &
Vivette Glover, Mode ofDelivery and Subsequent Stress Response, 355 LANCET 120, 120 (2000). I.M.
Goodyer et al. summarized various transitions in cortisol activity beginning from the earliest stages of
life, when general stressors elicit a strong increase in cortisol, to the second year of life, when many
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In contrast to cortisol, DHEA is synthesized both in the adrenal glands and
the brain.229 DHEA is unlike cortisol in its action, because while both DHEA
and cortisol are able to regulate the production of other molecules in the body,
DHEA also serves as a neurotransmitter directly. 2 30 This is in contrast to
cortisol, which exerts most of its effects on neurotransmission indirectly
through regulating other molecules or determining which genes are
activated.231 DHEA has been implicated in protecting the brain from
232injuries. Cortisol, on the other hand, modulates the loss of synapses and the
loss of neuron complexity.233 DHEA and cortisol are secreted simultaneously
from the adrenal gland in response to stress, but the two are regulated
independently; thus, the level of the two compounds may be significantly at
variance at any given time.234 Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that in
terms of behavior, relative amounts of certain chemicals tell more of a story
than any individual chemical could. Additionally, because of their multifaceted
regulation of the brain, very well-controlled studies must be undertaken to tease
out specific effects. General statements about high cortisol causing a specific
behavior must be carefully scrutinized.
Research suggests that correlations do exist between allostatic overload
and psychological disorder, but research also shows that some dysregulation of
the natural allostatic response may go "under the radar" of psychological
diagnosis while nonetheless producing altered behavior or cognition.2 35 While
psychological tests may overlook the dysregulation of the allostatic response,
the allostatic overload suggested by this dysregulation could be producing
stimuli (inoculations or physical exams) no longer elicit the strong increases in cortisol activity they had
previously. Goodyer et al., supra note 224.
228. See generally McEwen, supra note 215.
229. Etienne-Emile Baulieu & Paul Robel, Dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA) and
Dehydroepiandrosterone Sulfate (DHEAS) as Neuroactive Neurosteroid, 95 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI.
UNITED STATES AM. 4089, 4089 (1998).
230. Id.
231. Goodyer et al., supra note 224, at 246.
232. Id.
233. de Kloet et al., supra note 225, at 467 (describing studies where dendritic branching of
neurons is reduced in the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex).
234. Goodyer et al., supra note 224, at 246.
235. Some studies suggest that chemical abnormalities amongst battered women may not
necessarily be reflected in a DSM-IV diagnosis. The one study to date to examine diurnal cortisol found
higher evening salivary cortisol levels, collected over four days, in physically abused women compared
to non-abused controls, but no significant difference in cortisol levels between women with or without
PTSD status and women with or without depression. See, e.g., Sabra S. Inslicht et al., Increased Cortisol
in Women with Intimate Partner Violence-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 31
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 825, 832 (2006) (finding that healthy women differed from battered
women, but that there was no difference for those battered women with lifetime positive PTSD and
those without it); Maria A. Pico-Alfonso et al., Changes in Cortisol and Dehydroepiandrosterone in
Women Victims of Physical and Psychological Intimate Partner Violence, 56 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
233, 236 (2004) ("There were no significant correlations between depression, anxiety, and DHEA
levels. Finally, there was no correlation between total PTSD score and hormonal levels."). This reflects
a broader discussion about the inadequacy of PTSD to be an all-encompassing paradigm for assessing
the effects of trauma exposure. See, e.g., Linda J. Metzger, Basal and Suppressed Salivary Cortisol in
Female Vietnam Nurse Veterans with and Without PTSD, 161 PSYCHIATRY RES. 330, 330 (2008).
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behaviors that are later the basis for criminal charges. 2 36 In this sense,
understanding the physiological effects, like knowing the physical effects of
battering on the brain of the battered woman, merely helps construct a complete
picture.
Adding to the possible confusion over cortisol is that measurements in
different populations may point in very different directions. For instance,
cortisol, a key mediator of stress, has been found to be both elevated in one set
of studies on traumatized individuals and diminished in another set.2 37 These
variations may arise from differences in the type and severity of trauma
incurred,238 the sex of the subject,239 and the presence or absence of other
psychological conditions.240 An absolute elevation or diminution may be less
meaningful than comparisons between groups, comparisons of levels at
different times of day, or ratios of different chemical indicators throughout the
day. Specifically, where studies conflict, it may be more helpful to consider the
size and significance of the difference between the battered and non-battered
groups. Furthermore, close attention should be paid to the time of day when the
cortisol measurements are made since cortisol levels naturally vary from
morning to night. Any testimony relying on a single measurement of a
particular chemical to argue dysregulation should be scrutinized.
While research in the area is sparse,241 several studies have drawn
correlations between battering and dysregulation of the allostatic response.
Most notably, in a 2004 study involving battered women, Pico-Alfonso and
colleagues demonstrated abnormally high levels of cortisol in the evening, and
abnormally high levels of DHEA in both morning and evening. 242The
researchers were attempting to determine whether being a victim of intimate
partner violence led to any elevation or diminution of the two compounds,
which act together to produce allostasis. 243 Their study collected saliva samples
in the morning and evening for seventy physically abused women, forty-six
psychologically abused women,244 and forty-six non-abused women.245 Most
236. See, e.g., discussion on dissociation, supra note 145.
237. Michael G. Griffin, Patricia A. Resick & Rachel Yehuda, Enhanced Cortisol Suppression
Following Dexamethasone Administration in Domestic Violence Survivors, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1192, 1192 (2005) (citing six studies showing elevation and four showing diminution).
238. Griffin et al. found that the linear relationship between trauma symptom severity and baseline
cortisol levels was absent within a severely and chronically victimized group of battered women. Id. at
1198 (citing two studies where a linear relationship had been discovered).
239. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 235.
240. Id.
241. Dawn M. Johnson et al., The Cortisol Awakening Response as a Function of PTSD Severity
and Abuse Chronicity in Sheltered Battered Women, 22 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 793, 794 (2008)
(describing the "paucity of research" addressing these questions).
242. Pico-Alfonso et al., supra note 235, at 236-37.
243. Id.
244. Psychological abuse was defined as "verbal attacks (insults, humiliations), control and power
(isolation from family and friends; impeded decision making, economic abandonment), pursuit and
harassment, verbal threats (woman and family's life threatened, threats regarding the custody of
children, intimidating phone calls), and blackmail (economic or emotional)." Id. at 234-35.
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of the women surveyed were currently being abused or had been abused
recently.246 The researchers made sure that subjects were not significantly
different in age, tobacco use, pharmacologic treatment, childhood abuse, and
adulthood victimization (abuse outside of the battering relationship)-thus,
none of these factors contributed to the study's central findings: that being
either psychologically or physically abused correlates highly with increased
levels of DHEA and evening cortisol.247 Also important was that the same rise
in evening cortisol was present regardless of whether or not the battered woman
had depression or PTSD. These results could factor strongly in cases against
battered women whose actions were influenced by elevated cortisol, but who
did not fall into the DSM-IV's diagnosis for depression or PTSD at some
prescribed time. Finally, the results demonstrate that psychological abuse could
produce equally dramatic consequences for behavior as physical abuse. While
the Pico-Alfonso study pointed to elevations in evening levels of cortisol,
Griffin et al. found that battered women with PTSD demonstrated lower
baseline morning levels of cortisol. 248 When read together, the Pico-Alfonso
and Griffin studies highlight the dramatic and long-lasting differences in
allostatic responses between abused and non-abused women.
Further evidence that cortisol levels may highlight allostatic dysregulation
that psychological diagnoses miss comes from Sabra Inslicht and colleagues,
who demonstrated that cortisol levels were not significantly different between
battered women who currently had PTSD and those with PTSD that had
remitted (p=0.59). 249 Battered women with remitted PTSD showed elevated
levels of cortisol, but did not have any more PTSD symptoms than those
battered women who never developed PTSD.250 That cortisol levels would
remain elevated even after the abuse had ended and PTSD symptoms seemed to
subside has two important consequences for battered women defendants.
Battered women who experienced abuse may have lingering allostatic
responses shaped by that abuse. When examined, those same battered woman
may score low on tests for PTSD, but could nonetheless have been operating
under dysregulated allostatic responses. Cortisol measurements, taken at a later
time, could reflect the earlier condition of the battered woman.
Results from a 2006 study by Inslicht et al. also showed that cortisol levels
did not correspond to the severity of abuse in the severely abused group,
245. Id. at 234.
246. Id. at 239.
247. Id
248. The seventy women in the sample "suffered bruises to the head (81%), bruises to the body
(84%), broken bones in the head (17%), broken bones in the body (22%), cuts to the face or head (64%),
cuts to the body (41%), loss of consciousness (49%), damage to the teeth (26%), ruptured eardrums
(19%), damage to internal organs (12%), transmission of sexually transmitted diseases from their
abusive partner (25%), and miscarriages (13%) as a result of the violence." Griffin et al., supra note 237,
at 1194.
249. Inslicht et al., supra note 235, at 833.
250. Id.
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confirming several previous studies.251 While these studies show no correlation
between abuse severity and cortisol level in severely battered women, they did
not attempt to correlate abuse severity and cortisol level in battered women
who experienced less chronic abuse. Previous work has shown that cortisol
does vary with trauma severity in populations of war veterans,252 so it may be
possible that severely battered women reach some plateau level of cortisol.
Beyond this, no amount of additional abuse can change cortisol in a predictable
way.
Now that we have evidence of allostatic dysregulation, the next question is
what happens at the margins? If in fact there is some plateau for certain
responses to stressful stimuli, what result obtains when the individual is
functioning at the plateau? Cortisol, shown to be elevated in battered women,
has also been shown to interact with DHEA to produce dissociation. 253 This
has critical implications for the defense of a battered woman. One of the
experiences that battered women describe is feeling that their environment and
their thoughts did not align. Heretofore, defense experts relied on showing that
other battered women complained of the same problem during the commission
of their crime. These several studies operate together to suggest that
dissociation is not a manufactured or even imagined problem; it is, in fact, an
empirically demonstrable reality of stress and has practical consequences for a
battered woman's actions.
C. Gathering Evidence
Generally speaking, neurobiological evidence can be used to produce a
reasonable doubt that certain legal facts, such as malice or recklessness, were
present. To be relevant at the individual level, evidence of battering's
neurobiological effects needs to be measured and collected. Ideally, the
evidence would be collected at various times prior to and after the commission
254of the battered woman's alleged crime or crimes. By having evidence
collected at times prior to the alleged crime, the battered woman can establish
the causal presence of neurobiological effects. Lawyers currently do regard
hospital records as important in trials of battered women. In Dando v. Yukins,
appellate counsel went so far as to claim trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to obtain emergency room records concerning treatment the defendant received
251. See Inslicht et al., supra note 235 (confirming the results of Griffin et al., supra note 237).
252. See, e.g., Michael Kellner, Dewleen G. Baker & Rachel Yehuda, Salivary Cortisol in
Operation Desert Storm Returnees, 42 SOC'Y BIOLOGY PSYCHIATRY 849 (1997).
253. Charles A. Morgan III et al., Relationships Among Plasma Dehydroepiandrosterone Sulfate
and Cortisol Levels, Symptoms of Dissociation, and Objective Performance in Humans Exposed to
Acute Stress, 61 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 819, 822 (2004).
254. Ideally, levels of cortisol would be known before any abuse began, providing an instructive
baseline. Even in the absence of such a baseline, the battered woman could be compared to others
similar to her who had not experienced abuse.
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prior to going on a crime spree. 255 EEG recordings have also been used
previously to prove abnormal brain function. 256 Another type of evidence that
may be particularly useful is a blood test to measure hormonal imbalance. 25 7
Although the most obvious method for gathering neurobiological evidence
is through doctor visits, it may not be the most preferred. Fortunately, domestic
violence advocacy groups are increasingly becoming aware of the need to
conduct screening for health-related effects of battering. In March of 2010, the
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence ("PCADV") established a
special collection of materials to assist advocates in the field of domestic
violence in screening possible victims of traumatic brain injury. 2 58 A
259significant number of battered women have their diagnoses of TBI omitted.
By alerting advocates who provide care for battered women to the possibility of
TBI, the PCADV's move represents a promising step in understanding
battering as the infliction of a medical condition.
While the response by advocacy groups is appropriate and necessary, the
focus should be broadened to include screening for neurophysiological effects.
Saliva collection is a convenient and easily administered method for gathering
physiological evidence of battering. Cooperation between domestic violence
shelters and scientists should be encouraged in order to conduct more
expansive studies of battered women and the content of stress-mediating
hormones. It may be the case that the most convincing utilization of
neurobiological evidence comes through the concurrent use of both the physical
effects, such as traumatic brain injury, and the physiological effects, such as
heightened levels of cortisol.
PART IV. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEUROBIOLOGICAL EFFECTS
EVIDENCE
In the context of battered women defendants, neurobiological evidence
creates an overlap between the batterer's abusive acts and the battered woman's
alleged crimes, an overlap that has as a proxy the discrete and measurable
consequences of abuse. Due to the unique assemblage of characters and
criminal acts involved in the battered woman's case, the use of neurobiological
evidence in such a case could insulate itself from many of the criticisms that
have hindered its applicability in other cases. In Powell v. Texas, a landmark
case on compulsion, the Supreme Court, expressing uneasiness about the
255. Dando v. Yukins, 461 F.3d 791, 804 (6th Cir. 2006).
256. See Comm. v. Monico, 488 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Mass. 1986).
257. See People v. Sims, 750 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
258. Special Collection: Traumatic Brain Injury and Domestic Violence: Understanding the
Intersections, supra note 11.
259. Banks, supra note 150, at 291 ("Often, diagnosis of mild traumatic brain injury is not made,
even when a woman has had an obvious head injury (e.g., broken teeth, ruptured eyeball, sudden hearing
loss) or has been unconscious after interpersonal violence.").
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exculpatory force of psychiatric evidence, wrote that "[a]lmost all of the
traditional purposes of the criminal law can be significantly served by
punishing the person who in fact committed the proscribed act, without regard
to whether his action was 'compelled' by some elusive 'irresponsible' aspect of
his personality."2 60
As the Court intimated, law is uncomfortable ascribing criminal
responsibility to some inscrutable processes of the defendant's mind. This
hurdle is overcome within the specific context of battering because the
battering produces a tangible, measurable effect on discrete parts of the brain.
In battered women's cases, it is the batterer who, through his abuse, produces
the brain injury and sets into motion a sequence of events that makes the
criminal act possible. Rather than some elusive aspect of the defendant's
personality, the particular brain injury is fingered as being the contributory
causal factor.261 Once it is established that the act of battering by a batterer may
disrupt normal cognitive processing, making the criminal act more likely, the
battered woman's excuse has the potential to transcend the Court's critique of
psychiatric evidence in excusing a defendant's behavior.
This union distinguishes the battered woman's case from other cases in
which neurobiology would be submitted to the court. Because the
neurobiological consequences arise from the decisions of a conscious actor-
the abuser-and not by mere accident or act of negligence, it is a matter of
relocating the culpability for the crime to within that morally culpable agent.
This distinction implies the existence of a somewhat analogous class of
individuals: those who had their neurobiology altered not by a legal actor, but
by some other environmental or genetic factor. A car accident or naturally high
262testosterone are examples of such factors2. Whether these individuals should
be exonerated for their transgressions is a matter for both criminologists and
legal scholars to debate; what is clear is that the uneasiness that many people
feel about ascribing criminal intent to intractable causes or acts of chance is
alleviated in large part by the presence of the batterer as a fulcrum for
criminality. Furthermore, these cases could be distinguished in terms of the
individual's "brain reserve capacity." This is a term that captures the idea that
those individuals with support systems and high levels of pre-injury functioning
are better able to withstand the mental and behavioral deterioration following
260. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 540 (1968).
261. This is not a novel use of brain injury evidence. In the case of State v. Stuard, the boxing
career of a defendant was tied to organic brain damage which the expert stated "may have contributed
significantly to [Defendant's] acting-out of violent impulses." 863 P.2d 881, 899 (Ariz. 1993). The court
went on to hold that "conditions and mental illness diagnosed by the experts were significant causative
factors of the crimes. " Id. at 901.
262. Van der Dennen provides a comprehensive outline of the various ways an individual's
neurobiology could make them more prone to acting violently or aggressively. See van der Dennen,
supra note 3.
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brain injury. 26 3 Although it may seem as if a new class of "reasonable" person
is created by the involvement of the brain reserve capacity concept, this is not
necessarily so. The idea of brain reserve capacity merely establishes how likely
it was that an individual's injury played a causal role in the criminal activity. In
a more accessible example, consider alcohol tolerance. Individuals with high
alcohol tolerance would be less likely to receive the mitigating benefits of
voluntary intoxication, despite having consumed intoxicants, because their high
tolerance made them less susceptible to having their behavior altered.
Temporal proximity of the abuse to the alleged crime is also at issue when
gauging the influence of any neurobiological effects on culpability. This creates
two classes of defendants: those abused contemporaneously with their crime
and those abused in the past. The contemporaneous-violence group might
include battered women, but also other less sympathetic actors such as gang
members. Without a limiting principle, courts will be skeptical of evidence that
could exculpate these less sympathetic actors. However, existing legal
principles already foreclose any such uses. For example, to receive a duress or
involuntary intoxication defense, the defendant often has to demonstrate that
she was not reckless in placing herself within the situation where coercion or
intoxication was likely. This could act to exclude gang members, for instance.
Individuals deciding to participate in an enterprise where criminal behavior is
almost inevitable would likely be deemed reckless.
The second class of defendants, those who were previously abused but
were not suffering abuse contemporaneously with the commission of their
crime, would likely be limited in their use of neurobiological evidence through
a different mechanism. Cultural notions of self-help and introspection would
likely curtail the use of neurobiological evidence where the impairment is well-
known to the defendant. These notions would frustrate the ability of defendants
to procure favorable legal outcomes based on events taking place in the distant
past. If the defendant knew, for instance, that previous abuse had altered his
neurobiology through stress or physical violence, then the court may wish to
consider that abuse alongside any diligence exercised in minimizing the
likelihood of future criminality.
Intransigent disputes over neurobiology's potential to revolutionize
criminal law have largely forestalled the debate about its more modest uses in
American trials. Eagerness on behalf of reformers, matched by a similarly
zealous skepticism by opponents, has culminated in exchanges that are far less
nuanced than they could be. Disagreements about a future in which
neurobiology could send shockwaves through the legal system should not
263. Seven of the nine factors that Carson, Butcher, and Mineka list as favorably influencing
outcomes in cases of TBI relate to support and pre-injury function: (1) well-functioning pre-injury
personality, (2) higher educational attainment, (3) stable pre-injury work history, (4) motivation to
recover, (5) favorable life situation to which to return, (6) early intervention, and (7) suitable program of
rehabilitation. CARSON ET AL., supra note 82, at 523.
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overshadow the ripples it is presently making. Today, law considers
neurobiological evidence for a handful of purposes. Courts have also
acknowledged the admissibility of physiological effect evidence in the past to
corroborate different arguments about the mental state of a defendant. In Sims,
an appeal alleging ineffectiveness of counsel, the court wrote that a claim of
postpartum depression could be supported by blood tests.264 The use of blood
tests in confirming a certain mental state, stemming from repetitive instances of
battering, has never been suggested. If disrupted hormonal levels resulting from
postpartum depression are admissible for defenses, then the same disruptions
caused by a third party should surely be admissible-even if they do not
corroborate a syndrome or other disorder. Post-conviction proceedings have
also seen a surge in the amount of neurobiological evidence presented to
determine the appropriate punishments.265 As such evidence becomes
increasingly commonplace, battered women will be well-positioned to integrate
it into their various legal defenses.
A. Traditional Defenses
For a practitioner wishing to incorporate neurobiological evidence into the
defense of a battered woman, the pragmatic approach would be to deliver this
evidence within a traditional defense. The term traditional defense in this
context is taken to mean a defense, such as self-defense or duress, that many
battered women have relied on to successfully mitigate charges or attain
exculpation in the past.
In both self-defense and duress, the purview of the juror is often to decide
the question: "could she have avoided committing the crime?" Both duress and
self-defense implicitly entreat jurors to consider how much the battered
woman's control was subordinated by fear of the batterer. Duress goes further
and asks how the batterer maintained general control over the defendant's
autonomy. In both contexts, any indicator of courage, assertiveness, autonomy,
or independence from the batterer can imperil the battered woman's defense.
Jurors are invited to speculate about the appropriate level of fear or control
needed to render a particular crime excusable or justifiable.
When evaluating the defendant's fear, the inquiry is not whether fear was
present but whether it controlled the defendant's behavior. Facts bearing upon a
264. People v. Sims, 750 N.E.2d 320, 328 (111. App. Ct. 2001) ("Blood tests may have revealed the
type of hormonal imbalance indicative of postpartum disorders, evidence in support of the defense.").
265. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 102 S.W.3d 482 (Ark. 2003) (exploring the effects of a childhood
injury on petitioner's frontal lobe and its relevance to culpability); Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82 (Fla.
1999) (discussing frontal lobe dysfunction and using both EEG and CAT scans to dispute such
dysfunction).
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battered woman's fear have included: promiscuity,2 66 combativeness, 26 7
proximity of the abuse,268 proximity of the abuser,269 and rather circularly, the
way the battered woman responds to the abuse.270 If fear of the batterer is
necessary for self-defense, an even greater degree of control is necessary for a
battered woman offering a duress defense. The elements of duress go beyond a
fear of harm-the defendant must be completely constrained in her decision-
making in order to invoke duress. The constraint is understood, in most cases,
to be the batterer's control over the defendant.
Courts often wrestle with the question of exactly how much control a
batterer exerts through his abuse. In Wonnum, Judge Ridgeley, concurring with
the trial judge's motion to in limine bar a duress defense, wrote that because the
defendant had left the batterer's home for another location, taking him out of
proximity, the battered woman could not have been acting under his control.271
Similarly, in State v. Daoud, the judge compared a battered woman, coerced by
her batterer to drive while intoxicated, to someone who chose to drive an
injured co-worker even with a driver's license restriction-practically
trivializing the control a batterer exerts.272 At the other extreme, courts have
described the battering relationship as one in which the batterer can "break
down the personality of the actor, rendering him [or her] submissive to
whatever suggestions they make," 273 or where the battered woman "had no
alternative but to obey" her batterer.274 Over time, the statements of battered
women have been supplanted with the court's characterizations of control
although it is unclear which came first.275
Neurobiology skirts the philosophical issue of whether batterers "control"
their victims directly, focusing instead on how the effects of battering have
limited the set of decisions that the battered woman could have made given her
stress levels and cognitive function at the time the alleged criminal act took
place. Where certain types of abuse had occurred, it may be that the battered
266. United States v. Wilson, No. 92-10346, 1993 WL 55193 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 1993) (holding that
testimony about defendant's sex with a man other than her husband was relevant to whether she feared
for her life).
267. State v. Cramer, 841 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting an expert witness
claiming that fighting with others is inconsistent with the behavior of a battered woman); see also
Ferraro, supra note 2, at 202.
268. State v. Lundgren, No. 90-L-15-125, 1994 WL 171657, at *19 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1994)
(holding that there must be some "recent action on the part of the abuser" to cause the fear).
269. State v. VanZant, No. 64010, 1993 WL 437590, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1993) (holding
that no immediate threat sufficient for duress existed when the batterer was absent).
270. People v. Moseler, 508 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (drawing the defendant's
claim of fear into question where she fled from her batterer in a vehicle without regard to pedestrians).
271. Wonnum v. State, 942 A.2d 569, 576-79 (Del. 2007).
272. State v. Daoud, 679 A.2d 577, 582 (N.H. 1996) (citing State v. O'Brien, 567 A.2d 582, 584
(N.H. 1989) and State v. Fee, 489 A.2d 606, 608 (N.H. 1985)).
273. United States v. Marenghi, 893 F. Supp. 85, 94 (D. Me. 1995) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.09 cmt. 3).
274. Hunt v. State, 753 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
275. See, e.g., Comm. v. Lambert, No. 0423-1992, 1998 WL 558749, at *53 (Pa. Com. Pl. Aug. 24,
1998) (citing the battered woman's claim that her abuser "dominated her every move").
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woman's capacity for control was perfectly intact, but her decisions were
strongly skewed towards being more utilitarian or more risk-averse. Perhaps
choosing to alert the police to her batterer's abuse of a child would have been
the ideal choice, but the neurobiological effects of battering made this choice
unlikely. In this capacity, neurobiological evidence would cleanse the battered
woman's traditional defenses of vague and amorphous "control" definitions
that merely invite subjective post hoc speculation by judges and jurors. As
outlined in Part III, supra, both physical and physiological effects of battering
have repercussions for behavior and cognition.
B. Involuntary Intoxication
One way to conceptualize the neurobiological effects of battering is
through the involuntary intoxication defense. Even if such evidence is proffered
through alternative channels, its integration into a defense premised upon the
involvement of another may be instructive to defense counsel and expert
witnesses alike. To lay the philosophical foundation for an involuntary
intoxication defense, three propositions need to be revisited. First, the brain is
the necessary apparatus for making decisions and exercising what is
colloquially termed "free will." Decisions are made, but some decisions can
become increasingly likely or even inevitable given a prevailing chemical state
in the brain.276 Dramatic alterations in brain structure or brain chemistry have
the potential to impact brain operation, and therefore, behavior. 27 7 Second, for
battered women, some dramatic alterations in brain structure or brain chemistry
have an identifiable proximate cause: battering. Finally, for these women, the
battering compels the recognition of a separate actor: the batterer, who is
culpable in committing the battering. While it may seem unconventional, a
defense of involuntary intoxication may be the defense most consistent with the
central argument that a barterer's abuse leads to neurobiological effects that
make criminality either more likely or inevitable.
An inspection of appeals cases turns up no evidence that involuntary
intoxication has ever been employed in battered women's cases.278 To be sure,
related notions of diminished capacity and insanity do figure prominently into
some defenses of battered women. Thus, these defenses may effectuate some of
the same legal consequences for battered women defendants, but there inhere
specific advantages to advancing involuntary intoxication as a defense. These
276. For instance, we may choose to remain calm under stress, but the natural release of adrenaline
prevents us from exercising this choice.
277. On the other hand, minute changes in an individual's neurochemistry may take place from
moment to moment, but have imperceptible consequences for behavior.
278. To arrive at this conclusion, I examined every appellate case from all fifty states in which the
words "involuntary" and "intoxication" appeared. None of the cases in which the defense was invoked
involved battered women.
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advantages will be discussed below, but first I present a justification for
extending involuntary intoxication to cover this unconventional class of cases.
Suppose an individual, X, places a toxin into the beverage of another
individual, Y: the chemical consequences of Y's having consumed the toxin are
admissible evidence. Now suppose Y commits a crime in the induced
intoxicated state. In the majority of states, the evidence of Y's intoxication
exculpates Y entirely; in others, it may negate the state's evidence that Y had
the mens rea for the crime. 279
As demonstrated above, some instances of battering result in or have the
potential to result in pronounced injuries to the brain. In these cases, the
battering contributes to the likelihood of the criminal act. By considering the
battering a cause of the criminality, some degree of culpability shifting
logically follows, if we consider the most voluntary act in the chain was the
batterer's infliction of harm. The batterer was thereby either complicit in his
own downfall by setting into motion a sequence of events that made his death
more likely, or lowered the battered woman's inhibition to commit criminal
acts when threatened. Thus, one simple way to guarantee the exculpation of
battered women defendants would be to deflect some or all criminal
responsibility from them onto their batterer.
The most obvious objection to invoking involuntary intoxication in service
of the battered woman defendant is that no substance has been introduced into
her body. The discussion in Part III, supra, illustrates how chronic exposure to
stress could disrupt the battered woman's internal chemical balance. This
imbalance leads to various consequences for her cognition and voluntariness.
One approach to presenting this evidence would be to analogize to overdosing
on common antidepressants or combining antidepressants with alcohol.280
There is no principled reason why involuntary intoxication should hinge on the
mechanical act of introducing a foreign substance into the body. Courts must
recognize that a chemical imbalance can be produced in various ways: by
introducing a substance, by making the natural production of an endogenous
substance more likely, by depriving an individual of a substance necessary for
normal functioning, by preventing the operation of an endogenous process, or
by the removal of something necessary for maintaining homeostasis. On the
279. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Paul H. Robinson, Intoxication, 2 CIM. L. DEF. § 176 (2009).
280. Precedent for involuntary intoxication when an individual has an adverse response to these
anti-depressants is abundant. See, e.g., Boswell v. State, 610 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing murder conviction to permit the defendant to testify about involuntary intoxication caused by
taking Prozac and Xanax); People v. Hari, 843 N.E.2d 349 (Ill. 2006) (reversing and remanding a
murder conviction where the defendant argued that he was experiencing the unexpected adverse side
effect of taking Tylenol PM concurrently with Zoloft); State v. Jones, No. 93-114, 2010 WL 2471214, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 17, 2010) (holding that a claim of involuntary intoxication could have a bearing
upon whether the defendant acted with requisite recklessness).
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other hand, a limiting rule must exist to constrain defendants from always
alleging that a chemical imbalance contributed to the crime's occurrence. This
rule would ideally capture the multifaceted nature of chemical imbalance while
restricting its use in cases where the imbalance was unrelated to the abuse or
where the imbalance was too small to have altered the defendant's cognitions
or behavior. The same level of abuse may be sufficient to produce
"intoxication" in one defendant but not another. This is no different from
current involuntary intoxication jurisprudence, however. The true cynic might
suggest that defendants would claim involuntary intoxication as the result of
harassment or frustration, like road rage, for example. These claims, however,
could only be supported by valid scientific evidence of the defendant's
chemical imbalance. The defendant would need to proffer a strong scientific
theory to corroborate any account of intoxication. The operation of evidence
rules in conjunction with limitations already applicable to involuntary
intoxication may dispense with many potential abuses of this defense.
Acknowledging that the battering is the proximate cause of the battered
woman's altered judgment or cognition, however fleetingly, would catalyze the
acceptance of this defense strategy. Some courts have implicitly, and possibly
inadvertently, acknowledged the batterer as a causal force in the battered
woman's behavior. The court's connection between a course of mistreatment
and an "induced" homicidal response reifies the concept that a batterer's
persistent abuse may causally contribute to criminality. When the processes of
the defendant's mind are tangibly altered by a third party, the involvement of
that third party has been understood to induce a certain mind state. Consider,
for example, that in Tierny v. Ricci, a case involving a battered woman who
retaliated against her batterer, the court wrote:
[P]rovocation may be premised on "a course of ill treatment which can
induce a homicidal response in a person of ordinary firmness and
which the accused reasonably believes is likely to continue." The jury
must be instructed "to consider not only decedent's conduct and
threats that night, but also his prior mistreatment of defendant."28 1
Involuntary intoxication has numerous advantages over alternate defense
theories such as provocation. For one, involuntary intoxication is frequently a
complete defense,282 that is, it exculpates entirely. In addition, involuntary
intoxication does not attach the same stigma as a defense hinting at long-term
psychological impairment. Perhaps most significantly, involuntary intoxication
281. Tierney v. Ricci, No. 08-1918, 2009 WL 929306, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2009) (emphasis
added).
282. Todd Paul Myers, Comment, Halcion Made Me Do It: New Liability and a New Defense-
Fear and Loathing in the Halcion Paper Chase, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 603, 638 (1993).
2011] 167
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
is essentially a chemical defense: the source of the intoxication is detectable,
measurable, and less susceptible to false positives than a subjective assessment
of the battered woman's behaviors. As discussed in Part II, supra,
commentators have consistently impugned the battered woman syndrome for
failing to provide scientific support for its claims. A defense of involuntary
intoxication would be, first and foremost, a defense theory that hinges upon
scientific evidence.
One drawback to proceeding under involuntary intoxication is that in some
jurisdictions, the defense may need to satisfy the same standard as it would to
show insanity.283 However, several states have a test for involuntary
intoxication that is significantly less exacting than the corresponding insanity
test. 2 84 The benefits of having to satisfy a requirement for an excuse less
exacting than insanity are many: battered women could attempt to be excused
for conduct that was ongoing, the language by which the battered woman's
conduct would be excused would be far less damaging to her moral agency, and
in the case of the Durham rule, a direct relationship would be established
between the battering and the criminal conduct.
In Philadelphia, a woman was recently acquitted in the death of a child
under her supervision, after a night of sleeplessness and stress led to "stress-
induced chemical and physiological changes in the brain."285 An involuntary
intoxication defense would read almost identically: a night of abuse and weeks
of threats, leading to chemical and physiological changes that altered her
judgment or placed her in such fear that she could not act in accordance with
the law. When a battered woman's criminal conduct is even marginally
justified, conventional defenses such as self-defense are well-equipped to
persuade jurists or at least appeal to their sympathy. For other criminal conduct,
however, greater moral purchase could obtain from excusing the act as the
probable outcome of battering. The intoxication excuse also offers a formidable
parry to opponents of traditional abuse excuses who base their opposition on
the reality that not everyone who was abused committed a crime. In the context
of intoxication, not everyone who unwittingly takes a noxious combination of
pharmaceuticals or endures a shocking event will necessarily commit a crime-
yet the law exempts those who claim to have been affected by such factors.
Given that neurobiological evidence could serve to explain heightened
responses to fear or stress, increased apathy to child abuse, or reckless
283. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 279, § 176 (discussing the divergence among states in
formulating a definition of intoxication).
284. Some states, including Louisiana, Indiana, and Wyoming, adopt the Durham rule for
intoxication, asking only whether the involuntary intoxication was the cause of the criminal conduct. A
sizeable number of states, eleven in all, adopt some variant of the American Law Institute definition
which permits acquittal through a defense of intoxication by showing that the intoxication prevented the
defendant from conforming her behavior to the requirements of the law.
285. See, e.g., Larry King, Day-care Owner Acquitted in Child's Death, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 23,
2010, at Bl.
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endangerment of the lives of others, it presents significant exculpatory potential
for battered women accused of crimes.
C. Reshaping the Narrative
In battered women's cases, battering evidence is infrequently given a
holistic treatment by courts, perhaps reflecting a lack of involvement by
medical professionals in trials of battered women.2 86 When discussing the
defendant's case, courts often rely on generic statements such as "he would
curse, yell, and hit her,"287 "he beat her," 288 "[he] kicked, punched, smacked
and choked her,"289 "bruises and even . . . a black eye."290 In addition to
providing a limited verbal retelling, photographs depicting the battered
woman's bruises only tell a narrow part of the story; as discussed in Part III,
supra, neurobiological evidence is both visual291 and also non-visual. While
such narratives may rouse the sympathies of the jury, they do not capture how
the battering would impact her behavior. Moreover, if the victim's external
injuries are relevant for the jury's assessment of guilt, her internal injuries
should also be relevant.
Battered women's cases sometimes pose a challenge to defense counsel
when the defendant's otherwise sympathetic account is tainted by facts that
inflame the passions of the jury. For instance, the defendant may have been
especially ruthless in carrying out a crime or she may have seemed
unremorseful at trial. Presented with such cases, jurors may respond
emotionally by vilifying or discrediting the battered woman. Neurobiological
evidence could be used as a screen, keeping the emotional responses of the jury
out of their assessment of her behavior. Rather than combating the jury's
emotional investment in the facts of the case, some scholars suggest emotions
are integral to the administration of the criminal law. 2 92 While this may be true
in some sentencing contexts where questions of guilt have been resolved, in the
battered woman's case, emotions have the potential to color the jury's opinion
of the defendant and, consequently, predetermine the verdict.
286. In one recent case, however, the court capitalized on a doctor's relating specific consequences
of battering. State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 630 (W. Va. 2009) (citing, in the first paragraph of the
case, evidence from an emergency room physician about the defendant having sustained particular
injuries, including contusions and fractures of the head).
287. Wonnum v. State, 942 A.2d 569, 574 (Del. 2007).
288. Id.
289. Tierney v. Ricci, No. 08-1918, 2009 WL 929306, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2009).
290. People v. Bolden, 71 Cal. App. 4th 730, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
291. Comm. v. Crawford, 706 N.E.2d 289, 292 n.Il (Mass. 1999) ("Photographs of Crawford's
bruises were taken by the police and introduced in evidence at trial.").
292. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 355, 356 (2008) ("Normatively, emotion is crucial to a criminal justice system that seeks both to
educate citizens with its symbolism and to channel their justified outrage.").
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To neutralize the jury's negative emotional response to harmful facts in
battered women's cases, the defense can attempt to distance the battered
woman from the incendiary behavior. Accomplishing this distancing involves
describing the neurobiological effects of battering as an intervening cause
separating the battered woman's actual self from her alleged criminal act.
Distancing may be done either through an appeal to the empirical power of
neurobiological evidence or by shifting the focus onto the battering's effects
and thereby eliciting sympathy from the jurors.293 The most desirable outcome
for the defense is to show that because of this intervening cause, the battered
woman's altered neurobiology produced a mental state entirely alien to the
jury's intuitions about normal behavior. The jury is then forced to reconstruct
the battered woman's mental state through the defense's proffer of
neurobiological evidence.
A primitive attempt at this type of defense is apparent in the California
case of People v. Soma.294 In Soma, the court acknowledged "that the defense
could bring out 'testimony that a battered woman would react differently than
someone who has not been battered."' 295 The court continued by citing the
testimony of the expert in that case:
Dr. Kaser-Boyd then testified to the possible physiological reactions to
a threat. She said a threat could cause people to be impulsive and
focused on their own survival rather than careful and thoughtful,
leading to frantic or irrational behavior. Such a person could have a
296
reaction that is more intense, more explosive.
Dr. Kaser-Boyd admitted that she was not an expert in neuroanatomy,
neurophysiology, or neurochemistry-but that she was primarily a forensic
psychologist.297 Her ability to implicate the battering as an intervening cause
between the battered woman and her alleged crime rested on the jury's
acceptance that a "threat" could have contingent effects, such as impulsivity
and irrational behavior. This left the jury to speculate about how they or others
they know would respond to threats-creating little difference between them
and the battered woman. The jury did not receive any information about what
tangible consequences this "threat" creates in the brain or how it would threaten
the brain's integrity following chronic abuse. As the court stated, the defense
could have brought out evidence that would distinguish the battered woman
293. These two routes likely capture the modus operandi of the battered woman syndrome. See
supra Part II.
294. People v. Soma, No. B204682, 2009 WL 1743607 (Cal. Ct. App. June 22, 2009).
295. Id. at *4.
296. Id. at *5.
297. Id.
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from other individuals. 298 However, without an understanding of how brains
are affected by battering, such distinctions cannot convincingly be made. A
more complete description of how battering produces neurobiological
consequences would argue that such consequences, and not vague concepts
such as threats or stress, are the proximate cause of the criminal conduct.
While admittedly an early entrant into the jurisprudential landscape
combining neurobiology effects and the defense of a battered woman, the court
approached the scientific testimony with an open mind.299 In the future,
however, defense counsel may wish to rely less on generic phrases such as "a
threat could cause" and "more intense" and turn instead to more informative
language borrowed from contemporary thinking in the area of neurobiology. It
is both confusing to the judge and jury, and damaging to the defendant, to
merely offer conjectures based upon imprecise and outmoded generalizations.
Distancing may also entail pitting experts' competing claims about a
defendant's neurological makeup against one another and permitting only the
most convincing empirical arguments to prevail. By placing emotionally
aversive facts under the microscope, the lawyer asks the jurors to at least
temporarily suspend their initial inflammation regarding her behavior. The
involvement of experts at least forces the jury to scrutinize the behavior from
within the context of neurobiology. In the penalty phase of one criminal trial,
the defense expert testified that as a result of childhood abuse, the defendant "is
brain-damaged, has a history of seizures, and suffers from frontal lobe
dysfunction, which causes him to have impaired judgment and poor impulse
control."300 As a consequence of the abuse, the expert explained to the court
that the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance and duress. 301 To
connect the defendant's claim of mental dysfunction to the defendant's criminal
actions, the expert offered a subjective theory that suggested that the defendant
had used his mother as his "surrogate frontal lobe," and upon her departure, his
codefendant, Tivan Johnson, became his "frontal lobe." 302 The state, in
rebuttal, offered an expert who rejected any claims of mental dysfunction for
lack of objective evidence proving its existence. 303 The state's expert examined
CAT scans and EEG's of the defendant's brain and found no evidence of brain
298. Id.
299. The court did not find error with either of the two experts' scope of testimony, despite their
lack of scientific rigorousness. It held instead that Dr. Kaser-Boyd and the prosecution's expert, Dr.
Hirsch, both forensic psychologists, were sufficiently well versed in the necessary disciplines to "testify
about the subject of the limbic system and its impact on behavior in response to a threat." Id. at *6.
300. Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82, 83 (Fla. 1999). Interestingly, the defense also found it
appropriate to testify as to the source of the beatings: the defendant's father. This was either an attempt
to produce sympathy for the defendant or a culpability-shifting fact that ossified the father's actions as a
contributing cause of the defendant's criminality.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 87.
303. Id
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damage.304 The appeals court, apparently so swayed by the state's expert's
appeal to objectivity, offered a redounding rejection of the defendant's multiple
requests for consideration of mitigating circumstances based on mental
dysfunction. 305 By calling upon the jury to engage analytically with competing
theories and factual evidence, the defense creates an opportunity for the jury's
logic to overcome its emotions.
PART V. CRITICISMS
A. Neurobiological Evidence Pathologizes Battered Women
Certainly, it may seem unpalatable to think of any battered woman as
having her cognitive capability altered by battering, because in so doing we risk
diminishing her agency, stamping out any rationality we may have ascribed to
her decisions, and possibly stigmatizing her. Notwithstanding these theoretical
concerns, practical consequences are equally likely to beset the success of any
legal defense that calls a battered woman's agency into question: custody
determinations, civil commitment, and sex offender registration are all potential
outcomes of a blunt defense strategy. To be sure, utmost sensitivity is
warranted in cases where children are involved and custody makes legal
determinations of mental soundness an especially thorny issue. Neurobiological
evidence, no matter how comprehensive or how carefully tailored to the
questions it is intended to answer, will be vulnerable to attack on this premise.
Uneasiness about science's interference with legal understandings of
responsibility and cognition, along with law's outmoded treatment of mental
illness, work concurrently to frustrate the progress of defenses based on
neurobiological evidence.306 Only in a particular normative universe will the
outcomes of introducing neurobiological evidence be entirely concordant with
the best outcome a battered woman could receive. Lawyers, armed with this
knowledge, should be especially mindful to tailor their proffer of evidence to
the particular goals the defendant would like to see advanced.
During the development of the battered woman syndrome, many feminists
claimed that by pathologizing battered women, the syndrome reinforced
307problematic gender stereotypes.30 The claim was that the syndrome casts an
arguably reasonable response to abuse, namely retaliation, as a hallmark of
304. Id.
305. Id. at 87-89.
306. For a thorough discussion of the legal system's handling of mental disorder and related issues,
see Stephen Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond
Clark v. Arizona (Scholarship at Penn Law, Working Paper No. 143, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco
.org/upenn_wps/143.
307. Ferraro, supra note 2, at 113.
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disorder for an otherwise docile woman. 30 One scholar cogently notes that the
battered woman syndrome implied that women who remained in abusive
relationships were "too emotionally damaged to react in a 'normal' way."
309
Yet, that much of the jurisprudential development in the defense of battered
women defendants is focused on the syndrome 310 suggests law's reluctance to
think of battered women as reasonable. This inability to reckon with the
experiences of battered women outside of a pathological paradigm is highly
reflective of the development of positive law around the experiences of men.
That reasonableness is defined from a male's perspective is almost trivial
in light of the historical disenfranchisement of women in American lawmaking.
Considering that the Supreme Court did not find a Sixth Amendment
requirement for the empanelment of female jurors until 1975,"' and that until
Jimmy Carter took office in 1977 only eight women had ever served as Article
III federal judges, 312 it was almost certain that positive law would be tailored to
fit the facts of men's lives. From a constructivist perspective,3 13  if a
pretermitted population's knowledge and experiences never enter the standard-
making process, that standard will necessarily be comprised of only the
included group's perspectives, and to the extent that such a group has beliefs
about the pretermitted group, those beliefs will be contained in the standard as
well.314 Although the number of women participating in judicial standard-
setting has increased, the principle of stare decisis, cultural and political forces,
and a conservative legal practice militate against the overall impact women
could have on reconstructing the standards in battered women's cases.
Supposing the present standards were replaced with a more gender-inclusive
alternative, these new standards would still encompass only those behaviors
agreed upon as being "reasonable" by a significant segment of men, women, or
both. Unfortunately, there will be some battered women whose behavior might
still lie outside of this more democratic understanding of reasonableness;
consequently, at least some battered women's behavior would fall outside of
the reach of these new standards. Rather than believing that any battered
308. See, e.g., Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted in Reasonable Self-Defense: An Abused
Woman anda Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 65, 78-79 (2008).
309. Martha Shaffer, The Battered Woman Syndrome Revisited: Some Complicating Thoughts Five
Years After R. v. Lavallee, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 11 (1997).
310. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 32 (describing the ways that the syndrome influenced and
continues to influence the legal understanding of battered women).
311. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) ("Accepting as we do, however, the view that
the Sixth Amendment affords the defendant in a criminal trial the opportunity to have the jury drawn
from venires representative of the community, we think it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a
class may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequence is that
criminal jury venires are almost totally male.").
312. Mary L. Clark, Carter's Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the Federal Bench: His
Other "Human Rights"Record, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 1131, 1132-33 (2003).
313. For a general discussion of constructivism and how it provides social constructs that motivate
law, especially in the area of battered women, see HAMILTON, supra note 58.
314. For example, the currently understood "reasonable person" standard fails because even if it is
framed as gender neutral, it is inherently one-sided in that it has been shaped largely by men.
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woman can act as a reasonable person who has never been battered, the
responses of the reasonable person could be enlarged to include the responses a
reasonable person would have after enduring recent, chronic, and severe abuse.
Indeed, in Dando v. Yukins, the Sixth Circuit aptly characterized this intuition
when the court wrote:
[T]hose of us who are not so unfortunate to have to live with constant,
imminent threats of violence might look at the actions of a defendant
in Dando's situation from the relative comfort of a judge's chambers
or a jury box and wonder what reasonable person would have
facilitated Doyle's shocking crime spree .... .1
By acknowledging that a reasonable person, under certain conditions,
could act in a way that does not reflect how a majority of society's members
conduct themselves, we both rescue the battered woman's reasonableness and
simultaneously permit the use of neurobiological evidence to explain how a
reasonable person could be induced to act in a certain way.
One last permutation of the concern regarding pathologizing is that
battered women will be stigmatized, institutionalized, and have their parental
rights compromised if they are demonstrated as exhibiting some level of
cognitive or neurological impairment. Ideally, this unintended consequence
would be avoided by a more holistic understanding of the brain: much like the
side-effects of legally obtainable pharmaceuticals, the consequences of
battering are largely reversible. As society reorients itself to the contemporary
scientific view of the brain, it will no longer conceive of brain changes as
arcane and interminable derangement but rather as the brain's natural response
to injury. Unlike brain disorders that spring from ineffable genetic and
environmental influences, the abuse of battered women has notable causes and
effects. While incumbent upon lawyers and experts to explain that brain
changes within the battered woman are precipitated by a course of abuse and
many are reversible upon its cessation, there will inevitably be jurisdictions
which constrain defendants to choosing between "sanity" and "insanity."
Previously, women who chose to pursue insanity or diminished capacity
defenses faced the practical undesirability of lifetime confinement as well as
loss of child custody. Effective lawyering requires an acute awareness of these
consequences which, while they may not attach within the criminal court
context, are nonetheless dramatic and could render counsel ineffective under
recently elaborated Supreme Court precedent.316 The utmost circumspection is
necessary when proffering neurobiological evidence, as the court has
315. Dando v. Yukins, 461 F.3d 791, 802 (6th Cir. 2006).
316. See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (holding defense counsel
ineffective for failing to consider the adverse immigration consequences of agreeing to a plea bargain).
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occasionally floundered when trying to assess highly technical arguments
invading upon what is traditionally within the province of well-established
criminal law.
I would posit that much of the leftover consternation about neurobiological
evidence in defense of battered women arises out of a misalignment between
legal and scientific understandings of the mind, as well as the unfortunate
commingling of such evidence with the expansive literature on "free will."
Although much legal scholarship has been mired in abstruse speculation about
where the brain ends and the mind begins, it is not impossible to envision a
future where neurobiological evidence links up with pragmatic, practical
lawyering. Even in the absence of such reforms, the unfortunate misuse of
scientific knowledge to reincarnate misogynistic stereotypes about battered
women will inevitably invade the public domain.317 If nothing else, a
comprehensive account of the battered woman's neurobiology can combat
pernicious claims about battered women masquerading as scientific truth.
B. Neurobiological Evidence Is Cumulative ofPsychological Evidence
In a provocative and well-researched discussion on the limitations of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Teneille Brown and Emily
Murphy inveigh against the premature use of brain imaging data in criminal
trials. Because no part of this Article relies directly on such imaging, it is
largely immune to Brown and Murphy's critiques. One obvious point of
friction, however, springs forth from the implied claim that neurobiological
evidence is extraneous in light of behavioral evidence obtained through
psychology. For instance, the authors exclaim:
Inferences about mental state may also be made from evidence of the
defendant's flight, her attempts to conceal evidence, or from the
defendant and victim's prior relationship. It requires far fewer logical
leaps to infer intent from evidence of what actually happened at the
time of the crime than from heavily processed and statistical brain-
activation maps.m
The most obvious issue with this statement is that it strips the rich context
from the battered woman's narrative and gives jurors carte blanche to speculate
about the motivations of a defendant they are unlikely to understand. It is
exactly this vulnerability that precipitated the emergence of the problematic
317. See, e.g., Ali Binazir, Addiction Recovery: Why We're Addicted to Negative Behaviors,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-ali-binazir/addiction-recovery
-why-we_b_603566.html.
318. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as
Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1119, 1197 (2010).
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battered woman syndrome. Clearly, then, something of the sort that reformers
suggest-sociology evidence-is needed to at least reconstruct the entirety of
the battered woman's reality. However, there is no principled reason to exclude
the physical and physiological consequences for the brain, and for behavior,
from this contextualization. Neurobiological evidence, when presented
alongside the social science evidence, can bolster the social science claims and
make them relevant to the specific defendant on trial. Indeed, Brown and
Murphy point to this possibility when they describe fMRI as a "legitimizing
illustrative accompaniment for social and behavioral psychology data." 319
Going further, Brown and Murphy claim that behavioral psychology is
"much better equipped" than fMRI to resolve questions about intent, although
fMRI does avoid drawing the suspicions that jurors have about psychology
evidence.320 It is unclear whether they would extend their critique of fMRI
evidence to the far more unequivocal types of neurobiological evidence I have
summarized here. Supposing this critique is generalizable to other types of
neurobiological evidence, a possibility which the authors do not foreclose, and,
regardless, a legitimate critique of its own, such critique is susceptible to attack
on several grounds. For one, that behavioral psychology should enjoy a
monopoly over ascertaining intents is a troubling assertion: the discipline of
psychology has frequently shown itself to be less than objective in neutralizing
harmful stereotypes about women. 321 The most salient example is the
inseparable relationship between antifeminist accounts of female psychology
and Freud's psychoanalytic theory.322 More recently, an example is the
embarrassing introduction and successive retraction of the highly gendered
self-defeating personality disorder, which the American Psychiatric Association
had suggested might account for the tendency of battered women to seek
abusive relationships. 323
Another variation on Brown and Murphy's critiques about functional
imaging data is that neurobiological evidence cannot reveal information about
past mind states.3 24 This critique, however, is equally applicable to behavioral
3 19. Id.
320. Id.
321. See generally, e.g., Phyllis Chesler, Sexual Violence Against Women and a Woman's Right to
Self-Defense, CRIM. PRACTICE L. REP., October 1993.
322. Hannah Lerman, From Freud to Feminist Personality Theory: Getting Here from There, 10
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1, 12 (1986) (describing how Freud's concepts of women are "analogues with
male experience" and the undisputed negativity implicit in his psychoanalytic theory); accord id.
(explaining that the "principal subject matter of psycho-analysis" is ideas about sexuality, which are
central to its practice) (paraphrasing 18 SIGMUND FREUD, Two Encyclopaedia Articles, in THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 235, 247 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 2001) (1955); Martha T. Shuch Mednick & Hilda J. Weissman, The Psychology of
Women, 261 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 10-13 (1975) (describing the unsatisfactory and sexist treatment of
women within psychology literature at the time, beginning with Freud's theory of female psychosexual
development).
323. ANNE E. FIGERT, WOMEN AND THE OWNERSHIP OF PMS 164, 167 (1996) (discussing the clash
over the incorporation and eventual rejection of self-defeating personality disorder from the DSM-IV).
324. Brown & Murphy, supra note 318.
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psychology evidence. Other aspects of functional brain imaging are too
dissimilar to merit comparison with the more rudimentary brain scans and
blood tests I have proposed here. 32 5 The persuasive power of these types of
evidence lies more with the theories about behavior that correspond to them-
theories which have been tested empirically and through the observation of
patients. Thus, neurobiological evidence in this context largely circumvents the
concerns that plague functional imaging.
CONCLUSION
The history of the battered woman syndrome should serve as a cautionary
tale about overly reductive defense theories, the application of which abounds
326with stereotypes and weak causal argument. Excessive reliance on
categorical delineations premised upon suspect scientific evidence is bound to
generate numerous false negatives. While battered woman syndrome may
continue to be an effective proxy for battering evidence, battered women
defendants stand to gain significantly from the integration of neurobiology into
their defenses. Defense attorneys and experts must move beyond outdated
associations between the syndrome and protean narratives of mental
dysfunction-where necessary, neurobiology can deliver an individualized
account of how battering may have catalyzed a battered woman's actions.
Neurobiological evidence avoids the essentialist criticism because it is
capable of transcending racial, economic, and social distinctions to produce
individualized conclusions about facts, not defendants. Because of the limitless
variations possible, neurobiological evidence shares many features with social
framework evidence, which is considered to be a more inclusive method for
presenting evidence in battered women's cases. By forcing jurors to wrestle
with objective scientific facts regarding the effects of battering, the prejudicial
and often discriminatory sympathies of the jury will be diminished in
importance-leading to increasingly equitable trials for all battered women. To
argue coarsely about the mental health of any defendant would be a disservice
when more particular facts could be alleged. Constructing a cohesive argument
about the battered woman's past will require both attorneys and experts to
become aware of the objective and measurable content of neurobiological
evidence.
The gradual displacement of the battered woman syndrome for a more
holistic approach focusing on battering and its effects is widely understood to
be a welcome sea change. Simultaneously, the increasing awareness of the
325. Id. For example, CT scans and quantitative measures of hormone levels lack the visual flair
that Brown and Murphy are concerned will bias jurors.
326. See generally Buel, supra note 28, at 296-302 (discussing essentialist versus revised models of
the battered woman syndrome).
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neurobiological effects of battering by physicians and domestic violence
advocates will facilitate evidence procurement and interpretation. The
meaningful union between battered women's defense jurisprudence and
neurobiology would benefit from, but does not necessitate, a modernized
philosophy of neurobiology's relationship to the law. As long as courts are
willing to disentangle the effects of battering from the traditional conception of
the battered woman, defense attorneys can use neurobiological evidence to
provide at least a more complete, if not more accurate, understanding of the
battered woman's case.
